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The rise of China as a global economic and military
power has resulted in a lot of attention being paid
to China’s ability to innovate. Emerging Chinese
capabilities in science and in technology are
increasingly seen as a route for the transformation
of China from a follower country to a global leader
in innovation.
This study looks at one technology – single crystal
technology for making aircraft turbine blades – that
is critical for improving the performance of a
modern jet engine that powers advanced aircraft.
It tries to assess China’s ability to use this
knowledge in the production of aircraft engines
that then fly on airplanes. In making this
assessment we chose to compare the Chinese effort
with what had happened in the US – the pioneer
of this innovation.
From our analysis of the evolution of this
technology in the US through patents and
publications we surmise that outside experts
tracking technology in the aircraft engine domain
would have known about this technology in the
1985 to 1990 time frame. Chinese R&D engineers
are known to be particularly good at tracking new
developments in the western world. There is no
reason to doubt that they had identified this
technology as a key material for use in their aircraft
engine programme fairly early in the evolution of
this technology.
Overview and  Major Findings
Our study also reveals that after a lot of problems
with the reverse engineering of Soviet aircraft and
a number of attempts to build up capabilities in
both aircraft and aircraft engines via imports and
technology transfer agreements, the Chinese had
embarked on a major effort at revamping their R&D
infrastructure to design, develop and produce
aircraft engines by 1980. These activities
culminated in the development of the WS10 engine
by 1992. After a delay in flight testing lasting about
a decade, the WS10 was finally qualified in 2005.
However the WS10 engine that was qualified did
not use single crystal technology. It used the earlier
generation Directionally Solidified (DS) technology
that had preceded it.
This non-use of single crystal technology appears
particularly puzzling since our survey of the
Chinese technical papers published in Chinese
journals reveal that a number of Chinese R&D
organisations, including several closely linked to
aircraft development and production, had started
work on this technology in the early 1980’s. The
papers suggest that these organisations had
achieved considerable progress on all aspects of
single crystal technology. An independent
evaluation of Chinese capabilities by outside
experts from the US seems to confirm that China
could produce single crystal aircraft turbine blades
during the timeframe of the development of the
WS10 engine.
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In contrast to what happened in China, both DS
technology as well Single Crystal technology
became operational in the US within six to seven
years after invention. These technologies were
developed by the US aircraft engine company Pratt
& Whitney in their in-house Materials Research
Laboratory. This development was a logical
consequence of identifying certain bottlenecks that
constrained the performance of the engine and then
finding technical ways to overcome these
constraints. Though both these path-breaking
inventions gave Pratt & Whitney a major advantage
for about a decade, our research reveals that
by about 1985 most other aircraft engine
manufacturers in the US, UK, France, Japan and
Russia had caught up with the leader.
Figure A below provides an overview of the choices
that China faced in trying to build a world
class aircraft jet engine that used single crystal
technology for the turbine blades of the engine.
Even after more than twenty years of work, the
Chinese do not have an indigenously produced
engine that uses this technology. Their more recent
advanced aircraft the J-10, J-11 and the J-20 all
use imported Russian engines. If the Chinese had
skipped the DS technology and gone directly to
single crystal technology they might have been able
to narrow the technology gap significantly. Such a
riskier approach may be necessary for follower
countries to catch up with the leaders. In spite of
being competent in the technology the Chinese
decision-making system was not able to act
appropriately. This seems to suggest some
structural weaknesses in the Chinese ecosystem
for innovation at least in this area.
The study also examined the knowledge networks
in China and the US by looking at collaborations
between different entities in “single crystal”
technology as seen through published papers in
technical journals. The Chinese network is shown
Superalloy – performance in turbine engines – the evolutionary story
Invention to use 6 to 7 years
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Figure A: Window of Opportunity for China
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Knowledge Networks in China–Single Crystal Aircraft Turbine Blade Technology
30 papers 19 nodes–1 isolate–11 dyads–1 triad–
2 hub and spoke–6 separate disconnected sub–networks
Figure B: Knowledge Networks in China – Single Crystal Technology
Figure C: Largest Component in the US Knowledge Network
The US Largest Connected Sub-network
23 component sub-network component –8 companies–11
universities–3 public research agencies–one direct user
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in Figure B whilst the largest connected component
of the US network is shown in Figure C.
A closer look at the two networks reveals stark
differences between the two countries that seem
to be symptomatic of more deep-rooted
fundamentally different approaches.
The US network as revealed through published
papers is a 45 node network. The Chinese network
is only a 19 node network. There is therefore a
huge scale difference between these two networks.
The number of papers published – 30 for China
and 109 for the US – also reveals that the US enjoys
a considerable scale advantage.
47% of all papers produced in China in this area
are collaborative papers as compared to 22% for
the US.
Companies and Universities are the main
generators of papers in the US. This technology
was pioneered by companies and not universities.
All the major aircraft engine manufacturers in the
US are major nodes in the network. Publicly
supported agencies like the Air Force laboratories
and NASA are also big players. Companies also
dominate the patent scene in the US with patents
exceeding papers by a fairly big margin. By contrast
in China the major nodes are all publicly supported
research institutions with universities having a
somewhat smaller role. There are only two
companies represented in the Chinese knowledge
network related to single crystal development.
From Figure B we can also see that the Beijing
Institute of Aeronautical Materials (BIAM), North
Western Polytechnical University Xian (NWPUX)
and the Institute of Metals Research Shenyang
(IMRS) are the major nodes in the Chinese
network. They are linked to other nodes in a hub
and spoke configuration. They however function
as separate components of the network and are
not connected to each other.
From Figure C we see that all the major companies,
Air Force Research Laboratories, NASA are
dominant players in the US network. This 23 node
connected component of the larger US network is
significantly more powerful than the largest 5 node
BIAM dominated component of the Chinese
network.
Of the 19 nodes in the China network only one
node (5.3 %) is not connected to at least one other
entity. 18 out of the 45 nodes in the US network
(33.3 %) are not connected. The percentage of two
and more party collaborations within the Chinese
network is 6.5%. This percentage is only 1.7%
within the US network. The Chinese network is
more collaborative, indicative of a top down
approach. The US network is more individualistic
that suggests a more company driven bottom-up
approach to knowledge.
The density of the Chinese network is 0.09 which
is much higher than the 0.05 density of the US
network. This reinforces the point that the US
network is more individualistic or company driven
whereas the Chinese network is more collaborative
and research institute driven.
Even though the US is individualistic in approach all
nodes including the dominant ones are weakly
connected to each other in a 23 node configuration.
This would suggest that diffusion of knowledge and
technology will happen fairly quickly. In contrast the
Chinese network is clustered into dominant groups
with no connection between them. Such dominant
unconnected clusters suggest structural rigidities
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within the Chinese network. This could come in the
way of new knowledge being easily accommodated
within a complex project or undertaking.
Since there is a major time lag between the
development of these technologies in the US and
China, we also investigated the possibility that the
US network might have been more like the current
Chinese network earlier in its history. Our
investigation of papers published between 1970 and
1990 in the US reveals that there are no connections
at all between any of the major nodes in the
network. This means that the US network was even
more individualistic in the past before it has evolved
into its current loosely interconnected structure.
These comparisons between the US and China
suggest that the problems that follower countries
face are quite different from the problems faced by
leader countries. Leaders are always at the cutting
edge of new knowledge. Even if they are a bit
late in identifying and responding to a new
development they have the inherent strength to play
catch up. Though General Electric was behind in
single crystal technology they were able to catch up
and even surpass the pioneer Pratt & Whitney over
a period of about ten years. Follower countries on
the other hand have to resolve the dilemma between
immediate needs and long term interests. Imports
of technology and products create interest groups
within the ecosystem that could make decision-
making involving indigenous, emerging technologies
more difficult. These factors compounded by the
complex nature of the technology and its associated
organizational arrangements create rigidities within
the ecosystem of the follower country. This often
precludes them from taking riskier decisions
involving new technologies that are so necessary
for them to catch up.
This would suggest that whenever countries face
constraints such as embargos and denial of
technologies from the more advanced countries
they may be able to take greater risks and advance
more speedily along an emerging technology cycle.
China’s advances in the nuclear and missile areas
seem to suggest that this is so. More recently their
creative approach to dealing with the threat posed
by US aircraft carriers by developing an Anti-Ship
Ballistic Missile (ASBM) lends additional credence
to this line of thought.
Figure D and Figure E capture the innovation
ecosystems of the US and China as seen through
our study. The US – as stated earlier – has an
enormous advantage that it enjoys because of its
scale. We can see clearly that in every part of the
value chain - from idea generation to the
procurement of the final product - there is
competition in the US system. Our analyses of
patents in the US reveal that a lot of the early risk
reducing funding for companies came from NASA
or from one of the research supporting arms of the
various armed services. Since the US is already at
the cutting edge, ideas compete for value at this
stage. Independent multiple sources of funding are
available for the pursuit of these ideas. If ideas are
promising then companies motivated by profit try
to sell it to different buyers. The US is fortunate to
have the scale of being a global power. There are
therefore multiple possible buyers for new advances
that promise to push the envelope of performance
of a product. This ensures a fairly robust selection
mode for new ideas. Good ideas that come through
this selection process see further development either
in other national security establishments or move
into the civilian domain as in the case of single
crystal technology. Companies pursuing profit are
the crucial nodes in this network.
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The Chinese have tried to mimic the US on the
supply side of technology. Over the years they
have created multiple sources of funding for the
pursuit of new ideas. They have also put in place
a competitive selection process for the selection
and pursuit of ideas. In our case study we can see
that Chinese engineers had identified single
crystal technology quite early in its life cycle and
had developed the capability to make it. However
on the demand side the Chinese system is quite
different. The PLAAF is a complex entity that
makes crucial decisions including the ones on
imports and indigenous development. It has to
deal with immediate threats as well as with the
long-term creation of strategic capabilities. These
trade-offs may also be subject to the play of
various political and power equations within the
system. Unlike the US there are no multiple
independent users that could buy a product or
support a riskier new technology. China has tried
to create competition at the company level by
splitting its integrated Aviation Industry of China
(AVIC) into two entities AVIC 1 and AVIC 2
ostensibly to promote competition. However if
we carefully examine this division we see that
this restructuring did not really promote
competition but only changes a single monopoly
into two monopolies that operate in different
market segments. More recently the Chinese have
gone back once again into a single company mode.
Political factors more than other efficiency or
innovation consideration seem to dominate the
decision making system. The long delay between
the development of the WS10 engine and its flight
testing also suggest differences in approach
arising from the distribution of power within the
ecosystem.
As China becomes richer and starts projecting its
power on a larger scale it may be able to move
towards a more competitive ecosystem that is
closer to the US. However such a transformation
may require a fundamental ideological shift in the
role of the State and the power exercised by the
PLAAF. Whether China can affect such a radical
transformation of its political system is a moot
point.In the interim however, China is still a
considerable distance away from catching up and
overtaking the US at least in this technology and
product domain.
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Figure D: The US Eco-System for Knowledge Generation &
Use - Single Crystal Technology for Aircraft Turbine Blade
Figure E: China’s Ecosystem for Knowledge Generation &
Use - Single Crystal Technology for Aircraft Turbine Blade
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1.  Background
As a part of its mandate the International Strategic
& Security Studies Programme at the National
Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) had
identified “China’s Capabilities in Science &
Technology (S&T)” as a major area of interest. A
review of the Programme in October 2009 had
identified “Chinese Aeronautics, Materials and
Electronics” as potential areas of work for NIAS in
trying to address the larger issues of Chinese
capabilities in Science & Technology.
An Internet based literature survey of China’s
national capabilities in S&T revealed a very large
number of reports on assessing S&T Capabilities
at a national level. Some of the best reports were
from the Rand Corporation. These reports not only
addressed S&T competitiveness of the United
States1 but also included very comprehensive
assessments of Chinese capabilities in different
areas of science and technology such as
Biotechnology, Information Technology and
Nanotechnology.2 Some of these publications not
only looked at the technology or science side but
also addressed institutional, organisational and
political problems that could act as a barrier to
the diffusion of science or technology based
innovation into broader society. Still other studies
were exclusively focused on China including certain
specific regions of China.3
In January 2006 China unveiled a 15 year
“Medium- to Long-Term Plan for the Development
of Science and Technology”. This Plan4 called for
China to become “An Innovation Oriented Society
by 2020 and a world leader in S&T by 2050”.The
preparation of this plan was a major effort within
China. The Plan talks about the different
approaches needed to realise the innovation goals
outlined as necessary for the transformation of
China.5
Many studies on S&T and its links with innovation
are focused on the macro or broad picture. Studies
that look at specific technologies by contrast do
not address the larger social, political, economic
and institutional aspects of how specific
technologies diffuse through societies in the form
of new products and how the consequent changes
that they bring about affect the larger national
system. One area for original contribution would
be case studies on specific technologies. If such
studies could not only cover the hard core supply
side of technology but also address the softer part
of how developments in S&T diffuse into society
and become a major force of economic and social
change, they might help us get a different but useful
1 Titus Galema and James Hosek (Editors), “Perspectives on US Competitiveness in Science and Technology”, Rand National Defence
Research Institute, Rand Corporation, 2008.
2 For a comparative overview of 29 countries including China see Richard Silberglitt, Philip S.Anton, David R.Howell, Anny Wong et
al, “The Global Technology Revolution 2020, In-Depth Analyses – Bio / Nano / Materials / Information – Trends, Barriers, and
Social Implications”, Rand National Security Research Division, Rand Corporation, 2006.
3 Richard Silberglitt, Anny Wong et al “The Global Technology Revolution – In-Depth Analyses, - Emerging Technology opportunities
for the Tianjin Binhai New Area (TBNA) and the Tianjin Economic Technological Development Area (TEDA) Rand Transportation,
Space & Technology Programme, Rand Corporation, 2009.
4 For an overview of how this transformation is to be achieved please see Cong Cao, Richard P. Suttmeier, and Denis Fred Simon,
“China’s 15-year science and technology plan“, Physics Today, December 2006, pp 38-43 available at http://www.levin.suny.edu/
pdf/Physics%20Today-2006.pdf
5 11 key areas, 8 frontier technologies, 13 Mega technology products and two mega science projects are the specific routes through
which this transformation will be brought about.
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perspective on how innovation happens within
different countries.
Keeping this very broad mandate in mind, one area
of dual use interest - the development of aircraft
in China - appeared to be a particularly promising
line of research.6 During the course of conducting
this research a number of references to Chinese
capabilities in “Single Crystal Superalloy Aircraft
Turbine Blades” came up. Available public domain
information seemed to suggest that the Chinese
had mastered this technology and had developed
“indigenous aircraft engines and aircraft” that used
this state-of-art technology.
After extensive discussions we thought it
worthwhile to look at this technology as a typical
case study on how China manages a critical and
strategic dual use technology. Such a micro level
study would complement other more macro studies
on Chinese capabilities in Science & Technology.
In order to get some kind of an idea of the Chinese
Science & Technology system and its links to
deliverable products and services, there is a need
to compare it with some other system. We choose
to compare it with the US system simply because
of the availability of a lot of public domain
information and research literature. We also
decided that we would use patent information as
well as research papers to look at the development
history as well as the pattern of linkages between
different players in the Science, Technology and
Innovation eco-systems of China and the US. We
hoped through this process to get a micro-level
view of the working of the Chinese S & T system
and its connections with the delivery of hi tech
products and services.
2. Approach
The methodology we adopted was a comparative
case study approach. We decided to use the
emergence and evolution of the single crystal
technology in the US as a benchmark or template
for comparing China’s efforts at developing and
using “single crystal” technology for aircraft turbine
blades.
Through search of the published literature and
information available in the public domain we built
up a timeline of developments related to the
emergence of this technology in the US and linked
it to its use in a product – the aircraft turbofan jet
engine. We also used the US patent data base to
look at the history of patenting in this area of
technology with an emphasis on the link between
patents and competing technologies and
approaches.
We then looked at the number and type of papers
published in the various journals dealing with this
domain of knowledge. We also used these papers
as well as papers presented at Conferences to
understand collaborative efforts between different
players in this area.
Through a combination of patents, journal papers
and conference papers we built up a comprehensive
picture of how the technology emerged and
evolved in the US and how it was incorporated
into an aircraft engine flying on an aircraft.
In parallel we also studied the competition
between different companies within the US and
how the different players operating in this industry
responded to the emergence of this new capability.
6 R. Arun Kumar, “An Assessment of Chinese Airplane J-10 and WS-10A Engine”, REP – ISSP 1 -09, NIAS Working Report, 2009.
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The understanding that we achieved through
the above process was used to create a reference
template for looking at Chinese efforts in this
domain of technology.
Using public domain information we then studied
in some detail the evolution of the aircraft industry
in China. We particularly focused our interest on
the Chinese efforts to build a globally competitive
aircraft industry that catered to both military and
civilian needs. We studied two advanced military
aircraft – the J-10 and the J-11- that the Chinese
developed and their underlying technologies to
look for the incorporation of single crystal
technology or the related Directionally Solidified
Columnar Grain and Equiaxed Grain turbine blade
technologies into their aircraft engines.
We also studied developments in this domain
through a search of the patenting history in China.
We looked at the published papers in China for
identifying collaborations between different players
in the Chinese system (super alloys, turbine blades,
single crystal) and tried to link these up with
product timelines and patenting history.
Using this data we built up a comprehensive
timeline for the development of this technology in
China and linked S&T developments with its use
in a specific product or service.
We used the data on collaborations and
competition to compare the two knowledge
networks as seen through papers and other
publications in the US and in China. The role of
universities, mission organizations, companies and
government supported R&D entities were assessed
through both the paper links and patent
information.
From this comprehensive understanding of the
evolution of these two trajectories in these two
countries we then drew some inferences about the
capabilities of the S&T system as seen through this
case study. We also tried to look at the links
between the S&T system and other parts of the
Chinese establishment that helped or hindered the
diffusion of technology.
Finally at the end we raise a set of issues related
to the approach and the findings from this
research.
3. Single Crystal Technology &
Other Complementary Technologies
for Aircraft Engines
The turbofan engines that power modern military
as well as civilian aircraft are complex hi tech
products. Their development, production,
deployment and continued operation require a
large infrastructure as well as a cadre of experts
and specialists in various domains of knowledge.
These various elements or components have to be
put together and managed efficiently. Continuous
dynamic changes and periodic radical changes both
from the user side of this value chain as well as
from the technology or supply side of the chain
are an essential feature of this complex ecosystem.7
7 There is a lot of work done on characterising technological changes. They can be viewed as incremental, modular, architectural and
radical change. The ability of organisations especially companies to cope with different modes of change has also been covered
extensively in the literature on management. For one detailed assessment based on the study of the photolithography industry in the
US see Rebecca M. Henderson, Kim B. Clark, “Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and
The Failure of Established Firms”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 35 1990, pp 9-30.
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The efficiency of the engine depends greatly on
the temperature at which the turbine operates.
The higher the temperature the more efficient is
the conversion of the chemical energy into
thrust.
An engine consists of many critical parts. However
we can understand the key elements of the current
aircraft engine architecture8 in the following simple
way.
The fuel that powers the aircraft is mixed with
compressed air and ignited in a combustor that is
made up of materials that can withstand high
temperature. The combustion product which are
hot gases are expanded through high pressure and
low pressure turbines to provide the required
thrust. The turbines comprise a number of
geometrically shaped blades made of superalloys.
Superalloys are nickel based alloys to which a large
number of alloying elements are added. The
alloying elements are carefully chosen depending
upon the nature of the use and involve a fairly
sophisticated understanding of the phases available
in the alloy and how they respond to different
fabrication and heat treatment conditions.9
By providing some ways of cooling the elements
that go into these hot parts the temperature of
operation can be raised.
There are also fairly complex fabrication and heat
treatment processes involved in order to realize
the optimum performance from each part.
When jet engines were first introduced the
temperature of operation was limited by the
melting point of the material. Through proper
choice of alloying elements and through
improvements in casting fabrication and heat
treatment techniques obvious performance
improvements occurred.10
In addition to the above approaches engineers also
tried to raise the temperature of these components
by cooling the blades. Improvements in various
cooling techniques can also raise the temperature
of operation.
Another way to raise the temperature of the aircraft
component is to coat it with some heat resistant
refractory material. This once again raises the
temperature of operation of the engine and
improves its efficiency.
In spite of these improvements inherent technical
problems to further improvements soon become a
bottleneck. This is because of the way the products
are made. For aircraft turbine blades casting
techniques have remained the mainstay for the
various improvements achieved during the first two
decades of development.
8 The term architecture is specifically used to look at how various subsystems, components, parts are linked together. The replacement
of the piston engine that powered aircraft prior to the advent of jet engines not only changes the underlying subsystems, components
and parts but also changes in the way these are put together and linked. Such changes are both modular, architectural as well as
radical.
9 For a typical list of various alloying elements used in three generations of single crystal alloys see G.A. Kool, “Current and Future
Materials in Advanced Gas Turbine Engines”, Paper prepared for presentation at the 39th ASME International Gas Turbine and Aero-
engine Congress and Exposition June 13-16 1994, The Hague, The Netherlands, National Aerospace Laboratory NLR, NLR TP
94059, 31 January 1994. Though a very traditional domain as the number of alloying elements increase the complexity of understanding
the phase diagrams as well as the experimental facilities for research become significantly more complicated.
10 For people familiar with the technology S curve this is typically seen in a plateauing of the S curve of technology development.
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The casting approach that is traditionally used results
in a polycrystalline structure. This meant that the
strength in a particular direction (important during
operations) was lower than the inherent strength
of the material. With a large number of grains the
boundary areas between grains increase appreciably.
These boundaries are the major sources of corrosion
and reduced life during the temperature and stress
cycling that a typical turbine blade goes through
during its duty cycle of operation.
This limitation suggests two logical approaches
to improving performance. If the grain boundary
area can be reduced in the transverse direction,
performance can be improved. By orienting these
grains in a preferred direction that coincides with
the direction of maximum stress the performance
can be further improved.
Alternatively the grain boundary problem can be
completely eliminated if the entire part can be cast
as a single crystal aligned in the appropriate direction.
These technology trajectories – equiaxed multiple
crystal turbine blades, columnar directionally
solidified turbine blades and single crystal turbine
blades11 will be the major focus of our study. How
these technologies were embedded in products in
two different contexts – the USA and China–will
be the main focus of this report.
However we must keep in mind that when we
look at the trajectory of development of the final
products – the aircraft engine and the aircraft itself
11 Though this is so, we cannot ignore other related component technologies of the product – alloy composition, cooling arrangements,
casting and heat treatment methods as well as thermal barrier coatings. Changes in all of these happen simultaneously – but even
with all of them the final bottleneck will be the nature and type of grains that are formed. While not ignoring the other component
technologies this is the part we want to highlight in this study
12 For a good overview of all the related technologies see Robert Schafrik and Robert Sprague “Saga of Gas Turbine Materials Part III”,
Advanced Materials & Processes, May 2004 pp 29-33.
there are many other technologies that can affect
performance – in our specific case the fuel efficiency.
For the engine itself the designer could play around
with:
The material and the alloying compositions;
The heat treatment and other fabrication processes
associated with manufacture;
Combustion efficiency:
The design of the aerofoils (systems of vanes and
turbine blades) and the way in which they are
arranged;
The cooling system for the turbine blades;
The thermal barrier coating on the blades;
The nature of the grains – equiaxed grains,
directionally solidified columnar grains or single
crystal products.12
At the level of the aircraft there could be other
parameters – for e.g. engine performance can be
traded off for lighter weights or superior
aerodynamics.
There are therefore many technology choices or
degrees of freedom available for meeting a
performance requirement at any given time. The
choices that one makes for use in any specific
product would depend upon other factors like the
development status of the technology, the user
TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION IN CHINA
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preferences, perceptions of risk for the different
routes especially with respect to time schedules
fixed by leaders and managers, as well as
organizational, marketing and other social or
political factors. These aspects have to be kept in
mind in looking at the Chinese development of
capabilities in this area and in comparing it with
the American system. Figure 1 shows the blades
made by the three approaches. Figure 2 shows the
typical production line for a turbofan aircraft
engine.
Figure 1: Turbine Blades Made by Three Different
Methods (Source: Man Hoi Wong, 200313)
G.A. Kool in his review paper cited earlier provides
a simple overview of the developments in the three
technologies of interest – equi-axed poly crystal
grain, directionally solidified columnar grain and
directionally solidified single crystal – for making
aircraft turbine blades. This paper provides
information on alloy compositions as well as
cooling and coating of the turbine blades to
improve performance.14 Data on the performance
13 Man Hoi Wong, “Case Study: Single Crystalline Turbine Blades”, 2003, at http://my.ece.ucsb.edu/mhwong/documents/
turbine_blades.pdf
14 See Reference 9
Figure 2: A Typical Production Line for Turbofan
Aircraft Engines (Source: Flight International,
16 February 1980, p 474)
improvements arising from various developments
taken from Kool’s paper are presented below.
Figure 3 shows the improvements brought in
operating temperature through use of one of several
underlying technologies – cooling of the blades.
Figure 4 shows details of the percentage
improvements in specific fuel consumption over
different engines over time.
Figure 5 shows the improvements achieved through
the use of single crystal technology for aircraft
turbine blades as compared to equiaxed and
TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION IN CHINA
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Figure 3: Improvements in Operating Temperature by Cooling of the blades
(Source: G.A. Kool,1994)
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directional solidified columnar grain technologies
in three key areas – creep strength, thermal fatigue
resistance and corrosion resistance.
Figure 6 provides a conceptual overview of the
trajectories of development of the three
technologies
We can look at the development of various key
technologies as we move from the polycrystal to
the directionally solidified columnar grain to the
single crystal technology. Even in the single crystal
technology Generation 1 technology has given way
to Generation 2 and Generation 3 technologies
brought about by adding a new alloying element
Rhenium.
In the book “The World is Flat”, Thomas Friedman
talks about one of the world’s foremost aircraft
engine manufacturers Rolls Royce. Rolls Royce
outsources and offshores 75 % of the components
that goes into its engines. It however makes the
remaining 25% in-house. According to Friedman
this 25% is responsible for the critical difference
between Rolls Royce and other similar companies.
Friedman quotes the Chairman of Rolls Royce, “The
25 percent that we make are differentiating
elements. These are the hot end of the engine, the
turbines, the compressors and fans and the alloys,
and the aerodynamics of how they are made. A
turbine blade is grown from a single crystal in a
vacuum furnace from a proprietary alloy, with a
very complex cooling system. This very high-value-
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added manufacturing is one of our core
competencies.” 15
It is clear from the above that the technology
associated with making turbine blades using single
crystals is considered to be a key capability area
for a company making jet engines. Countries too
may view technologies associated with certain dual
use products like aircraft or rockets as strategic and
look to support and grow capabilities both within
the commercial sector as well as in national
laboratories or other national security
establishments.
The choice of dual use single crystal technology as
a case study to illustrate the evolution of the
technology and its incorporation into a product in
the contexts of China and the US should therefore
enable us to compare and contrast two systems
that follow different approaches. Through such an
understanding we may be able to get a handle on
the Chinese Science & Technology System and its
link with other larger political and economic
systems. Hopefully at the end of such an exercise
we would be better able to judge China’s mastery
over critical technologies needed for its future
emergence as a global power.
15 http://www.memagazine.org/backissues/membersonly/feb06/features/crjewels/crjewels.html Lee S. Langston, in his article “Crown
Jewels” describes the development of the three technologies – polycrystal  turbine blades, columnar turbine blades and single crystal
turbine blades in a simple easy to understand way.
Figure 6: Trajectories of Development
Superalloy – performance in turbine engines – the evolutionary story
Invention to use 6 to 7 years
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4. The Emergence and Evolution of Single
Crystal Technology in the US
4.1 Overview
According to Langston the single crystal technology
was pioneered by researchers at the Advanced
Materials Research & Development Laboratory of
United Technologies (Pratt & Whitney) in the early
1960s under the direction of Bud Shank. He states
“the first important development was the
directionally solidified columnar-grained turbine
blade, invented by Frank VerSnyder and patented
in 1966.” Langston provides a simple technical
explanation of the process of growing these
columnar grains and talks of the superior ductility,
thermal aging and greater tolerance to local strain
areas of the blades grown in this way. He then goes
on to talk about the first patent of a single crystal
turbine blade, a patent on an improved blade by
Bernard Kear, mentions Maurice Gell’s patent on
single crystal alloy composition improvements and
links these developments to a major increase in
the operating temperature of the aircraft engine
by 150 to 200 degrees. The account also talks of
Pratt & Whitney’s efforts at producing these blades
in the early 1970’s. According to him “Yields
greater than 95 percent are now commonly
achieved in the casting of single-crystal turbine
airfoils for aviation gas turbines, which minimizes
the higher cost of SX16 casting compared to equiaxed
casting.”
Langston’s article goes on to describe the
movement of the technology into the aircraft engine
and its first flight in an aircraft. The first time a
single crystal was actually used in an engine was
in the Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7R4 in 1982. This
first single-crystal blade engine powers the Boeing
767 and the Airbus A310.The J58 engine which
powered the famous Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird also
used turbine blades made of single crystals.
Langston’s account also mentions more recent
developments in the diffusion of this technology
from the military into the civilian electricity sector.
He states “General Electric’s 9H, a 50 Hz combined-
cycle gas turbine, is the world’s largest. The first
model went into service in 2003 at Baglan Bay on
the south coast of Wales, feeding as much as 530
MW into the United Kingdom’s electric grid at a
combined-cycle thermal efficiency just under 60
percent. The 9H, at 367,900 kg, has a first-stage
single-crystal turbine vane with a characteristic
length of 30 cm and first-stage single-crystal blade
of 45 cm (the blade lengths in the PW JT9D-7R4
are about 8 cm). Both vane and blade are cooled
by steam (from the unit’s combined-cycle
operation) rather than by air. Each finished casting
weighs about 15 kg and each is a single crystal
airfoil”. This implies that the diffusion of single
crystal super alloy technology from the higher value
and relatively smaller jet engine and aircraft market
to the larger and lower price power turbine engine
market is currently underway.
4.2 The US Patent Story - The Early Patents
Using the Langston account we looked at the US
patent data base to study how the technology
emerged and developed in its early phases. Starting
with the patents cited by Langston we tried to
look for links between these and earlier patents.
Table 1 provides a tabulation of all these related
16 SX stands for single crystal
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patents. A study of these patents gives us some
kind of a timeline of technological changes in this
domain from the end of the second world war to
1975.
The review of sample patents that we studied makes
it clear that nickel based super alloy compositions
that helped raise the temperature of operation of
the engine was the major driver of technology
development during the early years after the war.
The first patent to exclusively talk about single
crystal in a metal or alloy application was a US
government patent, Patent No 3060065 entitled
“Method for the growth of preferentially oriented
single crystals of metals” taken out in 1962. A
scrutiny of this patent reveals that it is a general
purpose patent that looks at equipment and
methods for producing single crystals of metals. It
does not specifically address the question of using
such a method for casting a super alloy or a turbine
blade.
The first patent for a single crystal application for a
turbine blade to be used for an aircraft engine was
US Patent 3519063 “Single crystal metallic part”
issued to United Technologies in 1970. United
Technologies was a major manufacturer of aircraft
engines in the US. This patent covers the product
which is an airfoil for a turbine application as well
as the method for producing the product. The
application is filed on February 16 1966 and the
patent is granted on February 10, 1970. So
obviously most of the work on this development
must have taken place in the company prior to 1966.
Going back in time, the first patent to talk about
Directionally Solidified columnar grain (also termed
Directionally Solidified or DS ) was another United
Technologies Patent US Patent 3124452
“Unidirectional solidification of lamellar eutectic
alloys”, that was filed in September 1960 and
granted in March 1964. However the major patent
filed by United Technologies that specifically
addresses the problem of making a gas turbine
blade using the DS technology is US patent
3260505 entitled “Gas Turbine element” filed in
April 1964 and granted in July 1966.
From the patent record it is clear that both the DS
columnar grain as well as the single crystal
technology was pioneered at United Technologies,
the parent company of the jet engine manufacturer
Pratt & Whitney.17 The record also suggests that
though other companies were also working on
super alloys and aircraft turbine blades it was only
United Technologies that was pushing the R&D in
the direction of DS columnar and single crystal
technology. Companies such as Rolls Royce, TRW
and General Motors were looking at other ways of
improving performance.
The DS columnar grain technology emerged out of
R&D at United Technologies in the period 1964 to
1966. Work on the next generation single crystal
technology would have been in a reasonably
advanced stage by 1966, the date of filing the single
crystal patent. Thus work on these two
technologies was going on nearly simultaneously
though the patents on DS were filed about two or
three years earlier.
The string of patents taken out by United
Technologies during this period also shows that
having come up with an original innovation they
17 Some patents refer to the United Aircraft Corporation. For our purpose United Technologies, Pratt & Whitney as well as United
Aircraft Corporation represent the same business entity.
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were quick to capitalise on it and protect it through
a string of process, product and combination
patents.
A study of these patents for the period from 1955
to 1975 also reveals that most of the patents did
not cite references to any published articles as prior
art. Most of them only refer to other patents that
were filed. Some patents that we examined in this
domain also referred to the interests of the US
government especially the US Navy. One can
surmise that there was US government support to
companies for carrying out R&D in this area.
From the patent record it appears that innovation
was largely company driven and application
focused. Universities and academia do not seem
to have played a major role..
4.3 The Early Publications - The First Paper
In parallel with the patent search we also tried to
look at the technical literature.The earliest
reference to single crystal development that we
could locate was a Review Paper for Materials
Science & Engineering, Volume 6, No. 4, 1970, p
231 entitled “Columnar Grain and Single Crystal
Table 1: Key US Patents Related to Super alloy Turbine Blades
Year US Patent No Company Patent Title
1955 2712498 Rolls Royce Nickel Chromium alloys having high creep strength at high
temperatures
1961 3008855 General Motors Turbine blade and method of making same
1962 3060065 US Government Method for the growth of preferentially oriented single crystals
of metals
1964 3124452 United Technologies Unidirectional solidification of lamellar eutectic alloys
1966 3248764 TRW Alloys having improved stress rupture properties
1966 3254994 TRW Methods for improving grain structure & soundness in
castings
1966 3260505 United Technologies Gas Turbine element
1970 3526499 TRW Nickel base alloy having improved stress rupture properties
1970 3494709 United Technologies Single crystal metallic part
1970*** 3519063 United Technologies Shell mould construction with chill plate having uniform
roughness
1971 3554817 United Technologies Cast Nickel columbium aluminium alloy
1971 3572419 United Technologies Doubly-oriented single crystal castings
1971 3567526 United Technologies Limitation of carbon in single crystal or columnar grained
Nickel base super alloys
1973 3738416 United Technologies Method of making double-oriented single crystal castings
1973 3763926 United Technologies Apparatus for casting of directionally solidified articles
1974 3793010 United Technologies Directionally solidified eutectic type alloy with aligned delta
phase
1975 3915761 United Technologies Unidirectional solidified alloy articles
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High Temperature Materials” by Ver Snyder and
Shank. Shank headed the R&D Group at United
Technologies and Ver Snyder is the person who
filed the first DS patent for a gas turbine element
in 1966. Both of them held important positions at
United Technologies.
The paper written by them is 35 pages long and
provides a fairly detailed description of both
directional solidification as well as single crystal
developments at United Technologies. Any person
with a reasonable background in materials would
be able to understand the implications of these
developments on the production of turbine blades
and the consequent economic benefits.
The paper refers to other papers and some patents.
Most if not all the references are to work carried
out at the Pratt & Whitney Division of United
Technologies. This finding reiterates the point we
made earlier that the hub of innovation in this area
are companies and not universities or other
academic centres.
Interestingly the paper is received for publication
on March 15, 1970 which is about a month after
the granting of the single crystal patent to Piarcey
of United Technologies on February 11, 1970. The
DS columnar grain turbine blade had also become
a commercial product in the military domain in
1969 and had entered the civilian domain by 1972.
In the case of DS columnar grain technology, the
publication of the paper is a little over three years
after the granting of the patent for a DS turbine
blade in 1966.
Patent protection seems to precede publication
especially in the US.
Maurice Gell, one of the patent holders described
in the early patent part of our report, along with
two other colleagues describes the development
of single crystal turbine blade development at
United Technologies in a paper presented at the
1980 Super alloys Conference.18 According to this
account, unidirectional columnar crystal or DS
technology and single crystal technology were
discovered and developed almost at the same time
in the 1963 to 1970 period.
Gell in his paper states clearly that the early single
crystal alloys did offer superior transverse strength
and ductility but did not at least initially offer major
improvements in the other parameters of interest
– creep strength, thermal fatigue resistance or
oxidation resistance.
By adding hafnium,19 direction solidified columnar
crystals matched even the potentially superior
properties of transverse strength and ductility
offered by single crystal technology. The company
therefore decided to push the DS columnar
technology and go slow on the single crystal
approach.
From Gell’s narrative DS columnar grain technology
based turbine blades entered service in military
engines in 1969 and in civil aircraft engines in
1974. This means that in the case of DS technology
it took about 5 years from invention to product in
the United States in the 1960’s.
18 M. Gel & D. N. Duhl and A. F. Giamei, “The Development of Single Crystal Superalloy Turbine Blades”, Paper presented at Super alloys
1980, pp 205 -214
19 The paper mentions 1969 as the year when hafnium addition was first tried out for the DS route. By this time an engine with a DS
blade had already entered service.
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Gell goes on to state that heat treatment studies
on the Directionally Solidified (DS) columnar alloy
shed new light on how single crystal properties
could be improved. This gave a new approach to
alloy design. This happened in 1975 and provided
a fillip to the technology. The single crystal
technology entered service in an engine in 1982
according to Gell.20
From Gell’s account of the development, though
both single crystal and DS columnar grain
technologies emerged at the same time, it was the
DS technology that was commercialised first.
Within about 6 years from invention it enters
service in a military engine. Though single crystal
technology was identified as a promising route
almost at the same time, the greater potential of
DS technology in matching the single crystal
performance at least initially comes in the way of
further commercialisation of the single crystal
technology. It is only after work on DS provided
new inputs around 1975 that United Technologies
goes ahead with the commercialisation of the
single crystal technology.
Though the first patent on single crystal was in 1970,
it is only after 1975 that the technological bottlenecks
for commercialisation of the single crystal approach
are finally removed. An engine with a single crystal
turbine blade is approved for flight in 1982. The
period from discovery to use in this case is about 16
years if we assume that the invention coincided with
the filing of the patent in 1966. However in 1966 the
competing DS columnar technology and subsequent
improvements to it are responsible for delays in using
the single crystal technology. There seem to be
additional bottlenecks to be overcome before the
single crystal becomes a viable route to engine
performance improvements. These bottlenecks to
further improvements were only removed in 1975.
If 1975 is taken as the date when the invention
process has been completed, it took about 7 years
from the date of the practical invention to commercial
use in the US in the 1970’s.
It is also clear from this analysis that improvements
to already developed technologies may come in the
way of the development of new technology and that
cost as well as market considerations are also
important factors for companies making strategic
R&D choices.
4.4 The US Patent Story Continued
A search of the US patent data base from 1976 till
date21 with the search word “super alloy” threw up
3855 patents.22
A more refined search with the terms – super alloy
– turbine– single crystal turned up 775 patents.23
If we consider the patents only up to the end of
2009 there are 757 patents in our domain of
interest. We also identified patents awarded to
major manufacturers of aircraft engines.
General Electric leads the patent list with 276
patents followed by United Technologies (Pratt &
Whitney) with 126 patents. Other companies with
20 As mentioned earlier single crystal technology entered service in the Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7R4 engine in 1982. This engine was used
both in the Boeing 767 as well as the Airbus 310 commercial aircraft.
21 Our analyses covers the period 1976 to August 24 2010.
22 As of August 24,  2010
23 Most of the patents are taken out by the turbine engine manufacturers or by companies supplying super alloy materials and
components. The companies who have taken out the 775 patents are amongst the biggest in these areas in the US.
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a fairly large number of patents are Rolls Royce
(31 patents), Allison Engine Company (16 patents),
Howmet Corporation (66 patents), Allied Signal
Aerospace (11 patents), Westinghouse (19 patents)
and TRW Inc. with 4 patents.
From the above data it is obvious that major aero-
engine manufacturers are big players in this
technology space. A number of companies who
specialise in the production of super alloy materials
and components like Howmet are also significant
players. General Electric appears to be ahead of
the others in terms of numbers though United
Technologies also has a large number of patents.
Smaller turbine engine manufacturers like Allison
and Allied Signal are also important players.
A more detailed scrutiny of some of the patents
showed that the US government had an interest
in several of the patents. It is obvious from this
that many of the companies involved in the
development of these materials and components
were supported by the Government. The various
Defence, Space and Aviation Research Funding
Organisations may be the sources of funding for
the early R&D.24
Since the focus of our interest in this study was
China we also tried to find out whether there were
any patents in this domain of technology assigned
to any entities or persons in China. A patent search
on this did not throw up any patents. Chinese
research organisations and China based researchers
working in this area of technology have apparently
not filed for any patents in the US. We also searched
for references to China in all US patents dealing
with super alloys. There were 13 patents that
referred to China amongst patents that had super
alloy somewhere in the text. A closer scrutiny of
these patents revealed that only 10 of them related
to our field of study.Most of these cited work that
had been carried out in China. Many of these
references to Chinese work and Chinese
publications seem to emanate from ethnic Chinese
researchers located in the US. Though we did not
investigate this aspect in greater detail, there seem
to be links between US based researchers of
Chinese origin and their counterparts in China.
This is indicative of an official Chinese policy to
leverage Chinese talent in the US and the western
world for achieving national goals.
Figure 7 below shows the number of patents taken
out every year from 1976 to 2009.
Figure 8 provides the cumulative patents which
may indicate in a better way the diffusion of
technology into products and services.
From the above trends we can see that the
technology of using single crystals for the
production of aircraft turbine blades had become
fairly widespread by about 1985. The number of
patents taken out every year shows an increase
and the cumulative total starts moving upwards
though a takeoff of sorts happens only around 1990.
These curves make itclear that within the US and
by implication the western world, single crystal
technology for turbine blade production had
become established by at least 1985. It had become
pretty well recognized definitely by about 1990.
Table 2 below provides details of the patents taken
out by the major players in the “super alloy”,
“turbine” “single crystal” domain.
24 In many of the patents the interest of the Air Force, the Navy and of NASA are mentioned.
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Figure 7: Trends in Patenting 1976 - 2009
Figure 8: Trends in patenting – A cumulative graph
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Table 2 Company Patents in the US – Trends
 
Year GE United Howmet Rolls Others Total Cumulative
Technologies Royce Total
1976 3 1 0 0 1 5 5
1977 1 0 0 0 0 1 6
1978 0 1 0 0 0 1 7
1979 4 1 0 0 0 5 12
1980 5 3 0 0 0 8 20
1981 1 2 0 1 0 4 24
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
1983 0 5 0 0 1 6 30
1984 0 5 1 3 2 11 41
1985 0 9 0 1 4 14 55
1986 0 7 1 1 3 12 67
1987 0 5 0 1 6 12 79
1988 0 4 2 0 4 10 89
1989 1 9 1 2 8 21 110
1990 0 6 0 0 12 18 128
1991 2 2 1 0 13 18 146
1992 4 1 1 0 4 10 156
1993 6 2 3 0 5 16 172
1994 8 4 6 0 4 22 194
1995 5 2 1 1 4 13 207
1996 10 3 3 1 12 29 236
1997 15 8 4 1 6 34 270
1998 21 5 4 1 9 40 310
1999 11 5 7 0 13 36 346
2000 12 8 3 2 14 39 385
2001 19 5 6 1 19 50 435
2002 32 7 8 4 22 73 508
2003 38 2 6 2 16 64 572
2004 11 1 1 3 21 37 609
2005 23 2 1 1 9 36 645
2006 14 1 1 0 14 30 675
2007 10 5 2 1 11 29 704
2008 10 3 1 3 9 26 730
2009 10 2 2 1 12 27 757
2010 4 6 0 2 6 18 775
Total 280 132 66 33 264 775  
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Figure 9 provides the patent information in the
form of a trend curve for the three major players –
GE, United Technologies and Howmet -so as to
enable us to look at the actions of these players.
We can also see that in the early period of the
evolution of this technology from about 1976 to
about 1984 GE is ahead of United Technologies.
Starting from around 1984 United Technologies
overtakes GE which remains somewhat static till
about 1991 when it starts becoming important in
Figure 9: Competition in Single Crystal Technology in the USA
Figure 10: No. of papers on Single Crystal Super alloys in USA (1970 – 2009)
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the patent domain once again. From about 1998
GE once again takes over the lead and becomes
the dominant player in terms of patents.
4.5 What do Publications tell us about Single
Crystal Development in the US?
Figure10 provides the number of papers published
in US from 1970 to 2009 that include the terms
“super alloys” and “single crystal”.
Figure 11 provides the same data but in cumulative
terms.
Figure 12 provides a comparison between annual
patents and annual publications in the US for the
period of our study.
Figure 13 provides the same data but in a
cumulative form.
From figures 12 and 13 we can clearly see an
increasing trend in both patents and publications
that becomes quite obvious and evident by 1985.
Any analyst tracking either the patents or the
publications would be able to make the assessment
that single crystal technology for aircraft turbine
blade manufacture had become a clear and visible
trend. In the US the number of patents always
exceeds the number of publications. We can also
see from the Figure 12 that after 1990 the trends
in patenting and publishing seem to follow similar
paths with publications lagging patents by about
a year.
The trends we saw become a little clearer in the
cumulative curve plot. The transition point when
the technology trend of growth and diffusion as seen
through patents and papers is between 1985 and
1990. Patents seem to reflect the emergence of single
crystal technology more clearly and easily than
publications at least in the US. It is also fairly clear
that the major drivers of this innovation at least in
the US are companies who make these complex
products. This goes against the standard theory of
universities or other academic establishment as
being the critical nodes for either the idea generation
or for its transformation into a working technology.
The conclusion we can draw from this review of
patents and publications in the domain of ‘super
alloys”, “single crystal” and “turbine” is that by
about 1985 its potential would be clear to any
researcher tracking publications. It would also be
obvious to any technology or R&D manager
tracking patents. Extending this logic a bit one
would expect any aircraft engine development
programme that started after 1985 to take note of
these developments in single crystal technology
and incorporate this knowledge into their
development plan or agenda for R&D.
In the USA the technology had become commercial
by 1982. We can see from the above that this
knowledge was available commonly by 1985.
Before we turn to China and what they did let us
look at what the other major players in the aircraft
engine business did.
4.6 Competitive Responses
From the patent record and from a review of some
of the published papers there is little doubt that
both the DS columnar grain route as well as the
single crystal route for the production of aircraft
turbine blades was pioneered by the Pratt &
Whitney Division of United Technologies. The DS
columnar grain route had become operational in 1969
whilst the single crystal route was incorporated into
an engine in 1982. One would expect that with these
TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION IN CHINA
27
Figure 11: Cumulated No. of papers on Single Crystal Super alloys in USA (1970 – 2009)
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Figure 13: US Patents and Papers – Cumulative – 1976 - 2010
Patents
Publications
successes or even as soon as the patents are granted
or filed, competitors who are in the similar lines of
business would have become aware of the potential
of this new technology and would try to benefit from
this new knowledge. Their responses could take
several forms. If they believed that it would be
difficult for them to match United Technologies in
the single crystal domain, they would try to improve
some other parameters of the product. This could
take the form of improved alloys, improved fabrication
or heat treatment processes, better thermal coatings
or even better cooling of the turbine blades.
Companies may also try to look for other novel routes
to compete with United Technologies in the domain
of both DS as well as single crystal approaches so
that they could improve their product offerings.
It is fairly clear from the patent and publications
record that the potential of single crystal technology
at least to the US and the western world had
become clear by the period 1978 to 1980. What
kind of responses did this evoke among the
competitors to United Technologies?
By early 1980 everybody in the turbine and aircraft
industry in the western world knew that single
crystal blades were about to enter service. The
Airbus 300, the Airbus 310, the Boeing 757, the
Boeing 767 and the Boeing 747 are all mentioned
as aircraft that would use the JT9D-7R4 engine
with single crystal blades.25
The response of one of the major competitors to
Pratt & Whitney, Rolls Royce is captured in the
18th April 1981 issue of Flight International.26
Under the heading “Rolls to develop 60,000 lb.
25 Flight International, 16 February 1980, p 474. Pratt & Whitney engines were in high demand at that time.
26 Flight International, 18 April 1981, p 1105
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RB211” the Programme Director Ferrie of the
RB211 engine outlines the response of Rolls Royce
to the Pratt & Whitney engine. Ferrie states that
the most powerful version of the RB211 the 524D
had a 12% better fuel efficiency than the Pratt &
Whitney JT9D engines that powered the early
Boeing 747s. Rolls Royce had achieved this not by
focusing on exotic materials but through paying
detailed attention to improved component design.
Ferrie goes on to admit that the RB211 does not
use DS technology but that improved engines that
Rolls Royce has under development may use single
crystal technology and would be available in about
5 years time. He admits that “Pratt & Whitney has
SC (Single Crystal) Technology sown up till the
mid 1980’s” but in spite of these developments,
the products of Rolls Royce would remain
competitive.27
It is clear from the above that even in early 1981,
one of the big names in turbine engines, Rolls
Royce, has not carried out any serious work on DS
or on single crystal technology. Their response to
the threat posed by the Pratt & Whitney single
crystal engine is to try and improve performance
through other component technologies.28 It is also
clear that Pratt & Whitney (United Technologies)
has a clear four to five year lead over Rolls Royce.
The remarks by the spokesman of Rolls Royce also
suggest that the United Technologies lead in single
crystal technology is not only with respect to Rolls
Royce but could also include other competitors
like General Electric.
From the patent record we can also see that there
is a flurry of activity around the time of the expiry
of the first United Technologies single crystal
patent in 1998. A number of patents are filed on
different aspects of the technology including alloy
compositions, casting, heat treatment, thermal
coatings, and different modes of making single
crystal castings. It is around this time that GE takes
over the leadership and becomes dominant once
again both in the patent and business arenas.
For the USA, DS columnar grain technology takes
about 6 years to progress from invention into a
working product. In the single crystal domain too
about seven years are needed from the invention
of “single crystal” to the commercial use of the
technology in an aircraft engine.
During the period of our study the leadership
position changes from GE to United Technologies
and then reverts back to GE after the expiry of
the patents and the knowledge created by
United Technologies becoming accessible and
replicable.
Companies are the hub of both invention and
innovation in the USA. Publicly supported R&D
carried out in companies appears to be critical.
Patent references are mainly to other company
patents. Even in publications many of the key
publications are from company personnel.
Publications describing some of the key technology
developments take place only after the patents are
granted. This seems to suggest that commercial
considerations and IPR issues are important
considerations in the diffusion of knowledge. The
role of the Universities at least in this technology
area appears to be peripheral.
27 Incidentally the first patent in the super alloy single crystal domain of technology granted to Rolls Royce was also in 1981. From the
patent record the United Technologies dominance continues till about 1998.
28 The management literature talks extensively on why many successful companies are not able to respond to major shifts in technology.
See Reference 7.
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In this realm of technology most of the innovation
appears to originate from companies.
5. China’s Quest for Self-Reliance in
Aircraft Technology
5.1 Historical Setting
Unlike the United States which created the modern
aircraft industry, China was a latecomer into the
aircraft development and production business.29
Very early in its history China needed to fight the
Korean War for which it needed aeroplanes. China
turned to the Former Soviet Union (FSU) for help
in creating an aircraft industry in China. Outright
purchase of different kinds of aircraft, licensed
production and technology transfer all happened
fairly early on.30 After the souring of relations with
the FSU the Chinese had no alternative but to go
ahead and start doing things on their own.31 But
this association with the Soviet Union did leave a
legacy of sorts that still affects the way complex
tasks in strategic areas are carried out in China.
Along with the indigenous development of key
technologies and products, the Chinese have also
gone ahead with licensed production of both aircraft
as well as key subsystems like aircraft engines. China
has been no stranger to the dilemmas faced by
latecomer countries between indigenous
development, imports and licensed production.
China has bought as well as manufactured under
licence a large variety of aircraft from other countries
including the FSU and now increasingly Russia.32
Though China makes many kinds of aircraft to get
an idea of their approach we took a look at the
evolution of fighter aircraft in China. China has
been in the business of making fighter aircraft for
about fifty years. The early fighter aircraft that the
Chinese produced were the F-5 and the F-6 which
were Chinese produced MIG 17 and MIG 19 Soviet
aircraft, the technology of which was transferred
to them by the Soviet Union. Their mainstay fighter
for many years has been the J-7 - a reverse
engineered Soviet MIG 21.33 Unlike the earlier
planes the Soviet Union had not transferred the
entire range of technologies and production
facilities to the Chinese for this aircraft. It took the
Chinese nearly a decade to achieve mastery of the
required technologies to produce these planes in
some numbers. A number of modifications and
changes have been made to this J-7 aircraft over
the years to produce several variants.
With a change in US sentiments towards China
after President Nixon’s visit in 1972, China’s access
to international products and technologies
improved. Companies like McDonnell Douglas,
29 Kenneth W. Allen et al “China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century” Rand Monograph MR-580 AF available at http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR580.pdf provides an overview of the development of military aircraft in
China.
30 The original factories for the production of aircraft were located at Nanchang, Shenyang, Harbin, Chengdu and Xian. These
locations have been the hubs around which the industry has grown. The purchase from the Soviet Union included all kinds of aircraft
– transports, bombers, fighters. However it was only for the MIG 21 that Soviet help included the transfer of knowhow for making
the Tumanski R-11 F turbojet engine.
31 China makes all kinds of aircraft and helicopters for both civilian and military use. Many of them were reverse engineered from FSU
designs and production. This is also true for aero-engines.
32 The more recent acquisitions include the civilian MD-80 and MD -90 from McDonnell Douglas in 1986 as well as the Su 27 and Il
70 from Russia in 1992 and 1993 respectively.
33 The Chinese fighters are designated with the letter ‘J’ (Jianjiji). The export versions are designated with the letter ‘F’
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Boeing and Rolls Royce started doing business with
China. Procurement of products and transfer of
technologies also took place. Sales of complete
planes were followed by transfer of technology and
licensed production of both aircraft and their
components.
In 1986 the US based company Northrop
Grumman signed a deal with China for $550
million to upgrade the avionics for the J-7.34 This
contract was however terminated prematurely after
the Tiananmen Square incident. In spite of ups and
downs in deals with the US, the Chinese entered
into a contract with McDonnell Douglas in 1992
for the licensed production of the MD 88 and the
MD-90 civilian aircraft. Reports in the public
domain suggest that the Chinese violated several
provisions of the end user agreement they signed
with respect to the location of some critical
machine tools.
Though problems with supply from the US as well
as the western world have affected China to some
extent, it has over the last twenty years received
substantial support from Russia. The end of the
Cold War saw the emergence of Russia as a major
commercial partner for China. There has been a
significant expansion of commercial transactions
between Russia and China that covers many
strategic areas including the aviation sector. Using
Russian help China embarked on a number of
advanced aircraft development projects. These
include the JF-17 aircraft in collaboration with
Pakistan, who is also a major buyer of this aircraft.35
This uses the Russian RD93 turbofan engine which
has been cleared for export to Pakistan by Russia.
With early help from Israel and later on from
Russia, China has also developed and tested an
advanced fighter aircraft termed the J-10. China
has also ordered from Russia a number of Sukhoi
27/30 aircraft.
China has started development of a completely
indigenous aircraft called the J-11. However
information available in the public domain suggests
that the J-11 that the Chinese are producing is a
Chinese copy of the Sukhoi 27/30 with many of
the components being made locally. Russia claims
that these Chinese efforts at reverse engineering,
is a violation of the original technology transfer
agreement.36
The J-7, the J-10, a large number of Sukhoi 27/30
aircraft and the indigenous copy of the Sukhoi
27/30 aircraft called the J-11 represent Chinese
evolving capabilities in aircraft development and
production. Of these the J-10 as well as the J-11
would qualify to be state-of art aircraft. The plan
seems to be to replace the imported Sukhoi
27/30 aircraft with their Chinese equivalents and
use it to further advance indigenous capabilities.37
5.2 The Structure of the Chinese Aircraft
Industry
The organisation of the Chinese aircraft industry
initially borrowed heavily from the Soviet model.
This typically involved a centralised organisation
34 http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/fc-1.htm
35 See the newspaper Dawn “Pak gets six JF-17 Thunder Aircraft”, March 15, 2008 available at http://www.dawn.com/2008/03/15/
top8.htm
36 Avio News, “The Chinese J11-B Fighter Aircraft Threatens Bilateral Relations with Russia” at http://www.scribd.com/doc/38158868/
The-Chinese-J-11B-Fighter-Aircraft-Threatens-Bilateral-Relations-With-Russia
37 http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/rowwpns/china.html provides most of the information on these developments.
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structure where five year plans with clear
objectives, deliverables and targets were to be
achieved. These plans, though using inputs from
some of the technology developers working within
the military industrial complex, were largely
formulated by the top political bosses. The State
through publicly funded and supported entities
would provide the resources to achieve these
targets. The division of work amongst R&D, design,
production and operations as well as their
coordination were all carried out by “Ministries of
Machine Building”. For strategically important
programmes special high level inter-ministerial as
well as political mechanisms for coordination of
the complex tasks needed were created. The
mechanisms for coordination as well as the
organisation of work changed in response to
changes in the political system and their perception
of challenges arising from global geo-politics.38
Informal networks of connections as well as
family connections had an impact on these
activities especially during the Cultural
Revolution. In spite of these complications the
Chinese have been able to achieve substantial
mastery over key technologies and high
technology products such as aircraft. However
this pedigree of the evolution of hi-tech industries
like aircraft does determine to some extent the
ability of China to innovate and incorporate
radical technology changes into the products or
services that it produces through its military
industrial complex.
As in the Soviet model each aircraft manufacturing
set up has associated with it a set of R&D
laboratories, test facilities as well as component
and subsystem development and production
entities. Originally in the Chinese approach all these
were clubbed under one umbrella directly under
the control of a Ministry of Machine Building.39
However in 1993 the Chinese decided to
corporatize all of it and created what is called the
Aviation Industry of China (AVIC).40 In 1999 they
seemed to realise that in order for true progress
and innovation to occur the various corporations
needed some kind of competitive pressure. To
promote competition they split the original AVIC
into two separate companies AVIC 1 and AVIC 2.41
This was also the time when decision makers in
China realised that for China it was not sufficient
to catch up with the west. It had to not only play
catch-up but it also had to be a pioneer in taking
new technology into new products and services
and become more innovative as a country. Drawing
some lessons from the US, the Chinese tried to
leverage the successes they had achieved in the
nuclear weapons and missile programmes and
extend these kinds of approaches to other key
sectors of the economy.42 Many major players in
the nuclear and missile industries went on to
38 For details of the organisation of the Chinese military industrial complex in the missile area early period please see John Wilson Lewis
and Xue Litai, “China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernisation in the Nuclear Age”, (Stanford:Stanford University
Press, 1994)
39 During the early period the 3rd Ministry of Machine Building apparently dealt with Aeronautics.
40 The two companies between them control over 100 industrial enterprises, 33 Research Institutes and 42 other subsidiary organisations.
The 2003 revenue of the two companies was $10 billion and they employed about 450,000 people.
41 Though this was so, the way in which the work was divided between the two companies ensured that they were both making different
products with very little overlap. So even though the purpose was to foster competition in practice a monopoly was converted into
two monopolies. Evan Medeiros et al, “A new direction for China’s Defense Industry”, Evan S. Medeiros et al., Rand Corporation,
2005, Report number MG 334.
42 One of China’s earliest such programmes was called Programme 863. For more details of this programme please see Avio News, “The
Chinese J11-B Fighter Aircraft Threatens Bilateral Relations with Russia” at http://www.scribd.com/doc/38158868/The-Chinese-
J-11B-Fighter-Aircraft-Threatens-Bilateral-Relations-With-Russia
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occupy major leadership position within the
military industrial complex of China.43 In 2008
AVIC 1 and AVIC 2 were again merged back into
one entity. Another interesting feature in China,
derived in part from the Soviet heritage, is that
both AVIC 1 and AVIC 2 make a number of non-
aerospace products. They derive more of their
revenue from the non-aerospace sector than from
the aerospace sector.
From these discussions we can see the special
problems that latecomer countries have in trying
to catch up and then forge ahead in complex
technologies. The military industrial complex has
several organisations and institutions that take part
in providing the products and services required by
the national system. The division of work and the
coordination of work are therefore inherently
complex. To deal with immediate problems all
latecomer countries necessarily have to buy hi-tech
products and services from other more advanced
countries. These are needed to cope with
immediate security threats. If countries aspire to
be self-sufficient they also need to make the
investments in organisations and people for the
development of the required knowledge and
capabilities. While some knowledge can be
explicitly acquired many aspects of hi-tech products
require significant amounts of tacit learning that
can come about only by actually doing things. The
organisational routines that are required are also
quite crucial and this combination of technology
and routines which is difficult to define
quantitatively is often loosely called “Capabilities”
or “Competences” in the management literature.44
This combination of import and indigenous
development creates major dilemmas for the
military industrial decision-making system. As a
consequence, the ability of the system to take risks
and make the necessary choices in new and more
radical technologies may be constrained by the
system’s ability to respond to and deal with such
changes. As the system’s complexity increases these
problems may get compounded especially for a
latecomer. While a centrally controlled overall
structure dealing with closely coupled and
interdependent technologies will promote
efficiency and product delivery it may not be so
efficient in coping with new challenges and changes
that may be required to the overall plan arising
from such changes.
These structural features of the Chinese aircraft
industry are important for us to understand the
ways in which decisions are made within the
Chinese military industrial complex and how these
decisions affect technological choices that need to
be made. This is particularly important for us in
our study related to the use of single crystal
technology for the making of aircraft engine turbine
blades in China.
5.3 Building Capabilities in Aircraft Engines
In the jet engine domain, China has over the years
established eight factories and their related
component, testing and development institutions.
The original Soviet purchase of Soviet planes in
43 For a detailed discussion of this theme See Evan A Feigenbaum, “Who is Behind China’s High Technology Revolution? How Bomb
Makers Remade Beijing’s Priorities, Policies and Institutions”, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer 1999. pp. 95-126
44 To build an aircraft a number of complex technologies have to be put together. Apart from the hard core technology elements - since
the technologies are coupled together tightly in delivering a product or a service - their development and integration pose special
problems of organization. Project management capabilities and skills for the development of such interactively and tightly coupled
multiple technology products are substantially more difficult than those required for say house construction. This involves a
significant component of “learning by doing” which cannot be easily replicated or learnt without actually going through the process.
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the 1950’s included the MIG 17 as well as the MIG
19 transfer of technology. The technology for
producing the power plants might have also been
included in this deal. However, as mentioned
earlier, the backbone of the Chinese fighter
capability for a long time after the withdrawal of
Soviet help was the reverse engineered MIG -21
aircraft which the Chinese called the J-7. Soviet
help for the J-7 also included the transfer of the
technology for producing the after burning
Tumanski R-11 F-30 turbojet engine. The Chinese
version of this engine is called WP-7. This and
variants of this engine have used to power the
different variants of the J-7.45 Chinese efforts to
develop their own power plants were apparently
not very successful.
In the 1970’s China acquired the license and the
technology to make the Spey Mk 202 turbofan
engines from Rolls Royce.46 The engine factory at
Xian makes these engines under licence. The
Chinese version of this engine is called the WS-9.
In 1980 China had identified turbofan jet engines
as a strategically important domain of technology
and initiated a major Research and Development
Plan to make all the key components and sub-
systems for an indigenous engine. In 1989 this
resulted in China embarking on an indigenous WS-
10 Engine development project. This turbofan
engine which is also of interest visa vis the single
crystal turbine blade development, was to be a
state-of art engine incorporating all modern
technologies that would be used to power future
Chinese aircraft.
In 1983 China managed to procure two numbers
of CFM 56 II engines from the United States after
getting export clearance. These engines were to
be used for upgrading the civilian commercial
Trident airliner. There was a big debate within the
US for export clearance as the CFM 56 core and
the hot sections are identical to F 101-GE-102
engine which powers the F-16 and the B-1B military
aircraft. The US exported the engines after imposing
stringent conditions for their use.47 Under the terms
of the agreement:
• no technical data was to be transferred with
the engines;
• the Chinese were not to disassemble the
engines;
• if the Trident retrofit programme had not
begun within 1 year of the engines’ arrival,
the engines were to be repurchased by the
manufacturer.
The Chinese offered to retrofit the engine at a
Shanghai commercial aircraft facility where GE
personnel would be able to monitor Chinese
progress. China reneged on the end use claiming
the engines were destroyed in a fire accident and
probably stripped the engine for detailed study and
reverse engineering.
Under the Sukhoi -27 / 30 deal that China has
signed with Russia (the Chinese version of this is
called J-10) the Russian AL-31 F turbofan engine
is also being produced in China.
45 China has also set up a number of factories for producing the different kinds of engines that are needed to power the various planes.
These are located at Shenyang, Xian, Zhuzhou, Pingba, Chengdu, Harbin, Shanghai and Changzhou.
46 See www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=181808
47 See http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851/index.htm Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security
and Military/ Commercial concerns with the People’s Republic of China, “Manufacturing Processes: PRC Efforts to Acquire Machine
Tool and Jet Engine Technologies” Volume III Chapter 10.l
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Other indirect technology benefits accrued to
China. In 1986, China Aviation Trade Import Export
Corporation (CATIC) obtained the technology of
the Pratt and Whitney FT8 gas turbine engine—
the deal included joint development, production
and international marketing rights. In 1991 an
agreement between GE and Shenyang Aero Engine
Corporation resulted in the licence manufacture
of parts of the CFM-56 engine. This was followed
by purchase of LM-2500 a commercial gas turbine
engine containing a hot section identical to the
more advanced GE F 404 engine. These import,
licensed production and reverse engineering efforts
went hand in hand with efforts to develop a state-
of-art turbofan engine indigenously.
5.4 Building a State-of-Art Turbofan Engine – the
History of the WS-10 Development
We present below a brief history of the
development of the most recent of the indigenous
engine development projects – the WS-10 Engine.
The original purpose of the development of the
WS-10 engine was to use it to power the J-10 and
the J-11 aircraft both of which were being built
with Russian help and both of which use a Russian
turbofan engine.
As we had mentioned in the previous section China
had identified the turbofan engine as a crucial
technology and initiated a major research
programme for the development of various
components that go into such an engine in 1980.
In July 1989, a project for the development of
‘Medial Thrust Demonstration Turbofan Core
Engine” (MTDTCE) was initiated. This project was
identified by the Commission for Science
Technology and Industry for National Defence
(COSTIND) as one of most important technology
projects of the eighth five year plan. This WS-10
engine was developed at the Shenyang Liming
Engine Manufacturing Corporation.
The design and manufacture of the test engine was
completed in 1991-92. Twenty one Factories and
Research Institutes were involved in this effort.
The Engine was Ground tested in 1992.
However in spite of completing all the ground tests
on the engine in 1992, the first flight test took
place only in 2002. The reason cited for this was
the non-availability of a suitable aircraft for the
Flight tests. The PLAAF did not want to risk the
single engine J-10 aircraft that was being developed
with Russian help by flying it with an unproven
new engine.The WS-10 flight testing had to wait
for the twin engine J-11 aircraft - - the Chinese
version of the Sukhoi 27 / 30 aircraft - to become
available before Flight testing began.
In 2004 there was a failure in the Flight Test. The
Flight Tests were completed in 2005.48
Though the above chronology suggests a three year
project (1989 to 1992) to make the aircraft, a lot
of work on the various components and
subsystems had preceded this starting from about
1980. It is quite likely that the Chinese gained from
assistance provided by Russian engineers. Though
inputs from the west were not available, Russia
was helping China with the Sukhoi 27/30 licensed
production including the power plants. This
coupled with the fairly long preparation time from
48 Details from http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/this-is-the-real-face-of-taihang-ws-10-turbofan-engine.html
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1980 to 1989 might have helped accelerate this
process.
The chronology of major events also reveals that
though the engine development was completed in
1992 it took at least 10 years for the flight testing to
commence. This is a long gap between development
and flight testing that seems to point towards a
number of internal problems even for a high priority
project like the WS-10. This long gap between ground
test and flight test seem to suggest technical as well
as organisational and institutional problems within
the aircraft development ecosystem.
The J-10 was an indigenous development based
on Russian technology and used the Russian AL
31 F engine. One of the purposes of the WS-10
turbofan engine development was to use it to
power both the J-10 and the J-11. However because
of the longer dimensions of the WS-10 the J-10
could not accommodate the WS-10. The obvious
reason why the J-10 was not designed for the WS
10 engine was because decision-makers especially
from the PLAAF expected major delays in the WS-
10 engine. They might not have wanted to link an
operational need with a risky development option.
Therefore the J-10 was not designed to
accommodate the WS-10 whose dimensions were
larger than the dimensions of the AL31 F Russian
engine. It is surprising to think that the
development of the J-10 did not take into account
the possible availability of an indigenous engine
especially an engine which COSTIND considers to
be a major nationally important project. This seems
to suggest that there were indeed major problems
with the WS 10 project and that the powerful user
organization the PLAAF has sufficient clout within
the system to rule out the incorporation of a higher
risk indigenous power plant into its operational
aircraft.
Even if WS-10 was larger it is possible that some
changes could be made in the J-10 to accommodate
the larger WS-10 especially for the flight testing
programme. However it appears that the decision-
makers in the PLAAF were not very keen on
subjecting the single engine J-10 aircraft to testing
with an unproven engine.
Because of these concerns, the flight testing had
to wait till the J-11 twin engine aircraft that was
also being developed became available. This J-11
was modified to accommodate the WS-10 engine
by replacing one of its two original AL31 Russian
engine with the indigenously developed WS-10
engine before flight testing could be completed.
Reports also suggest that the PLAAF has also
placed a major order with Russia for the import of
a few hundred AL-31F engines to take care of their
immediate requirements. This seems to suggest
that the users still have concerns about the
reliability and performance of the WS-10 engine.
It is surprising that a strategically important project
like the WS-10 turbofan engine had to wait for ten
years before a suitable platform was available for
flight testing it. It is also surprising that the design of
both the J-10 and the J-11 had been conceptualised
without the possibility of incorporating an indigenous
power plant at a later stage.
This illustration of how decisions are made on
technologically important projects makes it clear
that decisions are not always based on straight
forward technological considerations. Other factors
including geo-political, organizational and power
factors do seem to find a place in the way decisions
are made within the military industrial complex of
China. These events are not different from what
happens in other similar placed countries who are
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trying to play catch up and also want to forge ahead
to become leaders in critical domains of technology
This understanding may also give us some insights
into the way the Chinese military – industrial
complex deals with issues raised by radical
technology changes and their absorption by the
system. Single Crystal Technology for Aircraft
Turbine Blades is one such technology. Let us try
to understand what happened to this technology
in the development of the WS-10 engine.
5.5 The WS -10 and Single Crystal Technology
for Aircraft Turbine Blades
From a perusal of the specifications of the WS-10
engine available in the public domain it is clear
that this engine developed by the Chinese only
uses Directionally Solidified Columnar turbine
blades in the WS-10 engine. This technology is one
generation behind the single crystal technology.The
available details make clear that the materials used
for this are Chinese super alloy compositions with
specific Chinese nomenclatures and designations.49
It is also clear that the WS-10 does not use single
crystal technology.50 Figure 14 provides the window
of opportunity available to Chinese decision-
makers to catch-up.
As we had mentioned earlier knowledge about
single crystal technology and its advantages for use
in the hot sections of a turbofan engine would have
become common by about 1985. Many western
companies both in Europe as well as in the US
had already initiated work to catch up with the
pioneer Pratt & Whitney.
49 The alloys used in the high temperature part is mentioned as DZ125 or DZ125 L. From the literature, only the alloy DD 3 seems to
correspond to a single crystal composition
50 http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/?tag=turbofan-engine
Superalloy – performance in turbine engines – the evolutionary story
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Figure 14: Trajectory of Development in Single Crystal
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The Chinese have demonstrated great capabilities
in tracking key technologies and achieving mastery
over them through a combination of imports and
indigenous development.
The WS-10 programme was initiated in 1980. Even
if knowledge of single crystal technology was not
known, Chinese researchers would have soon
come to know of it. If this were so the WS-10
programme should have taken cognizance of such
a development and incorporated it in some form
or the other during the development phase which
stretched out over a fairly long period starting from
1980 and going on to almost 2005.
For some reason even though the Chinese had
developed capabilities the Chinese decision-
making system did not choose to go with single
crystal technology.
This does raise certain fundamental issues about
the ability of the Chinese system to cope with major
changes in technology. To understand this a little
bit better we need to understand in more detail
Chinese efforts to develop this technology.
6. China & Single Crystal Technology for
Aircraft Turbine Blades
As discussed in the earlier Section, China has not
been able to design, build and produce a state-of
art turbofan engine that uses superalloy single
crystal technology. There could be several reasons
for such a situation.
It is possible that even after a lot of effort Chinese
engineers have not been able to develop the
technology to the level required for use in an
operational engine.
It is also conceivable that they do have the
capabilities in this technology but due to either
schedule or budget constraints they have not been
able to develop it to the required levels necessary
for use. Such development schedule and budget
mismatches are normal for countries that are
playing catch up since there will always be tradeoffs
between immediate short term needs of user
agencies and the longer term aspirations of
developers and political strategists.
There is also the possibility that given the
complex nature of the technology and its link
with the military and political systems,
development projects are subject to the pushes
and pulls of the different power groups within
the ruling establishment. These factors also
influence the evolution of a particular trajectory
of technology.
In the pursuit of our understanding of what
happened with single crystal technology for aircraft
turbine blades in China and what happened to it
we analysed publications and patents data from
China using the SCOPUS Database.
6.1 Single Crystal Superalloy Patents in China
As mentioned earlier China does not have
any patent on single crystal superalloys in the
USA.
As far as patents in China are concerned United
Technologies, General Electric and Siemens
Westinghouse (all US companies) have been
granted patents on single crystals super alloys by
China in the years 1987, 1992 and 2000
respectively. These seem to be defensive measures
taken by the lead companies in the world to protect
themselves in China.
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The Institute of Metal Research, Shenyang (IMRS)
filed a patent, “Third Nickel base high temperature
single crystal alloy in low cost” in China in the year
2005 which was granted in 2007.51 In the year 2008,
Northwest Institute for Nonferrous Metal Research
filed a patent “Hexahedron shaped sub-micron Ni
core metal compound mono-crystal particle
preparation” in China which was granted in 2009.
Patent protection does not appear to be a priority
for development activities in China at least in this
domain of technology. Clearly the patent scene in
China is very different from what happens in the
US where both protection of Intellectual Property
and defending it aggressively is a key for commercial
success. In the absence of a patenting culture, a
scrutiny of patents in China offers little help in
making an assessment of the status of super
alloy single crystal technology for aircraft turbine
blades.52 This makes it necessary to look at the
other source of information–published papers.
6.2 Single Crystal Published Papers from
China – What Do They Reveal?
Using the keyword “Super alloys AND Turbines”
in the SCOPUS Database, we were able to obtain
the abstracts of 134 papers published from China
during the period 1984 to 2009. There might have
been papers published earlier but there could not
have been many. We know from other sources that
after Soviet help dried up in the early 1960’s
Chinese put in a lot of effort in reverse engineering
the Soviet MIG -21 aircraft which they renamed
the J-7. So work on many aspects related to both
the production of the aircraft, the engine as well
as critical technologies was definitely taking place
inside China though this aspect may not be
reflected in the papers.
The first Chinese paper that included the terms
superalloys and turbines appeared in 1984. Of the
134 papers dealing with superalloys and turbines,
30 papers also referred to single crystals.
The first Chinese paper on single crystal appeared in
1986. It referred to a specific kind of single crystal
alloy the DD3. This was followed by a paper that
appeared in the Journal of Materials Engineering
(Caliao Gongchen in Chinese) in 1993. This was
authored by Wang Qingsui and Wu Zhongtong from
the Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials (BIAM).
The paper claims that DD3 is the first Ni based single
crystal superalloy developed in China.Following this
in 1997, Tang et al. claim that DD3 is comparable to
PWA 1480 ( the first single crystal superalloy
developed by Pratt and Whitney) and that BIAM has
been able to produce it at low cost and that it can be
used in making aero engine turbine blades. Based on
the date of publication of these papers, a time line of
single crystal development in China can be drawn
which is shown in Table 3.
From Table 3 we can see that the Chinese have
been working on three types of single crystal alloys
– the DD3 series, the DD4 series and the DD8
series. These may correspond to Generation 1,
Generation 2 and Generation 3 single crystal alloys
or they could refer to different alloys for use in
different kinds of power plants.
From the published papers it appears that Beijing
Institute of Aeronautical Materials (BIAM) has
been in the forefront of development of single
51 www.ipexl.com
52 The recent Chinese five year plan wants to change this approach. It emphasises innovation as well as aggressive pursuit of IPR. One
should expect to see some dramatic developments in this area soon.
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crystal in China. It was a part of the AVIC 1
consortium.
SCOPUS does not include many of the Chinese
journals in its data base. An independent search on
the single crystal development in China showed that
a special issue was devoted to BIAM and its work
on super alloys in China in the journal “Advanced
Performance Materials.” This appeared in 1995.
Three papers included in this journal are of
particular interest.53 Yan et al. mention that the
single crystal super alloy DD3 has been used as
turbine blades for some advanced aero engines. In
their paper they also mention that a DS cast alloy
IC6 developed by BIAM is a promising material
for high temperature turbine blades of advanced
jet engines operating in the range of 1000-1100°C.
Chen54 in his paper “Developments of cast super
alloys and technology for gas turbine blades”
mentions that  “for more than thirty years, a series
of advanced performance cast super alloys have
been developed for making blades, vanes and other
high temperature parts of various aero-engines”.
There is a reference to DD3 single crystal super
alloy which is supposed to have been developed
using a method designed by Wu et al. in 1987.55
The paper also mentions that the DS (Directional
Solidification) technique for super alloys was
initiated in BIAM in the mid 1960’s. Chen goes on
to say that the cast turbine blades, including DS
and SC (Single Crystal) blades with complex
internal air-cooling passage, are widely used for
aero-engines in China.
Han et al.56 in their paper refer to a new
Directionally Solidified (DS) Ni3Al alloy IC6 which
has been developed for gas turbine blades and
vanes. It is claimed to be a potential material for
turbine blades of aero engines.
Many of the journals that were being originally
published in Chinese are also now being published
in English. The idea seems to that in order to
improve international visibility and also to get cited
more often you need to publish in English. A survey
of the editorial board members in some of the
journals clearly suggest that China has
collaborations with Japan, Singapore, USA, The
Netherlands, South Korea, Canada, UK and
Sweden. However the collaborations are mostly
with ethnic Chinese living in these countries.
The papers seem to suggest that the development
of single crystal turbine blade technology had made
significant progress in China starting from the mid
1980’s and were being used in the final product.
6.3 Other Information on Single Crystal
Technology in China
In 1995 the Asian Office of Aerospace Research
and Development (AOARD) in cooperation with
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the US
Army Research Office, and the Office of Naval
53 Yan, M.G., Han, Y.F., Cao, C.X., and Wu, Z.T. “Some recent developments of Advanced Titanium Aloy and Nickel Base Super alloys
in BIAM, Advance Performance Materials, 2, 217-229 (1995).
54 Chen, R.Z. Development of Cast Super alloys and Technology for Gas Turbine Blades in BIAM, Advanced Performance Materials, 2,
249-257 (1995).
55 Wu, Z.T., Wen Z.Y., and Chen, D.H. “Composition design and experimental study of SC alloy”, Acta Metallurgica Sinica, 23 (4): B171,
1987.
56 Han, Y.F., Wang, Y.M., and Chaturvedi, M.C. Strengthening in a DS casting Ni3AL Base Alloy IC6, Advanced Performance Materials,
2, 259-268 (1995).
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Research cosponsored an International Workshop
on Ordered Intermetallic Alloys and Composites
in Beijing, China. This team visited a number of
research institutions in China. These included the
North-Western Polytechnical University Xian
(NWPUX), North West Institute for Nonferrous
Metals, Institute of Metals Research Shenyang
(IMRS), Shanghai Jiatong University (SJTU),
Beijing University of Astronautics and Aeronautics
(BUAA), University of Science &Technology Beijing
(USTB) Chinese Iron & Steel Research Institute
(CISRI) and Beijing Institute of Aeronautical
Materials (BIAM).
On the Chinese Iron & Steel Research Institute
(CISRI) they have the following comment “In
super alloys, they are involved in the R&D; and
production of Fe, Ni, Co, based super alloys, in
the wrought, cast and Powder Metallic (PM) forms.
In cast super alloys, this includes polycrystalline,
directionally solidified (DS) and single crystal
turbine blades and vanes”
Their comment on the Beijing Institute of
Aeronautical Materials (BIAM) states “BIAM has
22 labs, including the National Key Laboratory of
Advanced Composites. BIAM operates 13 small to
Table 3: Time line of Ni Based Single Crystal Superalloy Development in China
Year Journal Item Author Affiliation
1986 Conference Proceeding Creep Behaviour of Ni based Beijing Institute of Aeronautical
super alloy (DD3) Materials (BIAM)
1993 Journal of Materials DD3 Single crystal Super alloy is Beijing Institute of Aeronautical
Engineering (Cailiao mentioned in a publication Materials (BIAM)
Gongcheng)
1995 Act Optica Sinica Review of Single Crystal Super alloy Beijing Institute of Aeronautical
(Guangxue Xuebao) development in China Materials (BIAM)
1996 Theoretical and Applied Life study of DD3 Single Crystal North-Western Polytechnical University
Fracture Mechanics turbine blades is discussed Xian (NWPUX)
1996 Journal of Propulsion Calculation of Strength and life of a North-Western Polytechnical University
Technology (Tuijin Jishu) Single crystal turbine blade Xian (NWPUX)
1997 Journal of  Materials Review Beijing Institute of Aeronautical
Engineering (Cailiao Materials (BIAM)
Gongcheng)
1997 Journal of Materials Comparative Evaluation of DD3 and Beijing Institute of Aeronautical
Engineering (Cailiao PWA 1480 Materials (BIAM)
Gongcheng
1999 Acta Metallurgica Sinica Creep study of DD3 Beijing Institute of Aeronautical
(English Letters) Materials (BIAM)
1999 Journal. Of Aeronautical DD402 Single Crystal Super alloy Chinese Iron & Steel Research Institute
Materials  introduced  (CISRI)
2001 Chinese Journal. Of DD3 – Strength and life of Zhuzhou Aviation Powerplant Research
Aeronautics anisotropic Single Crystal blade Institute(ZAPRI)
2002 Chinese Journal Of DD3 – Life prediction models NWPUX and Aviation Institute Zhuzhou
Aeronautics (AIZ)
2003 Scripta Materialia DD8 new super alloy single crystal Institute of Metal Research, Shenyang
Thermal mechanical fatigue of DD8 (IMRS) & Korea Advanced Institute of
S&T (KAIST)
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medium size aerospace materials production lines,
and some 20 jointly owned factories…….”
They then go on to say “BIAM’s processing and
production capabilities and equipment are impressive
for a research institute, having the capability to not
only research new alloys and processes, but take them
through to limited production in such areas as
conventional, DS and single crystal investment
casting, isothermal forging, PM fabrication, and super-
plastic forming technology”.57
This makes it clear that at least two of the major
research centres in the area of interest to us had
the capabilities to research, develop and produce
single crystal turbine blades in 1995 though we
may not be very sure when they acquired the
capability to do so.
If this were indeed so in 1995 it is puzzling to
understand why these technologies that obviously
were being researched and developed for quite
some time before 1995 were not included in the
development of turbine blades for China’s state-
of–art WS10 engine that was also under
development during this period.
6.4. Networks of Knowledge – Collaboration and
Competition in China
As mentioned earlier there are 30 papers related to
super alloy aircraft turbine blades using single
crystals published in both international and Chinese
journals by researchers from various China based
organisations during the period 1986 to 2009.
These papers were scrutinised to look at various
organisations within China carrying out research
in this domain as well as various research
collaborations these organisations had with other
entities both inside and outside China.
Figure 15 presents an overview of the papers
published by these entities including their
57 From a Report submitted by Capt. Paul McQuay, accessed from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/contractor/9514.html
Knowledge Networks in China–Single Crystal Aircraft Turbine Blade Technology
30 papers 19 nodes–1 isolate–11 dyads–1 triad–
2 hub and spoke–6 separate disconnected sub–networks
Figure 15: Knowledge Networks in China – Single Crystal Aircraft Turbine Blade Technology
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collaborations. The number of papers and the
number of collaborative papers are both presented
in this figure.
There are a total of 19 organisations carrying out
research in this domain of knowledge. Out of these,
three are entities located outside China. There is
no significant collaboration with the USA.
There are nine institutes of research, 5 universities,
two companies and 3 foreign research institutes
in this network.
There are six distinct and separate unconnected
components of this network. The two largest sub-
networks have five nodes each followed by a sub-
network of 4 nodes, two networks of two nodes
each and one entity with no collaboration.
Zhouzhou Aviation Power Plant Research Institute
located at Zhouzhou, (ZAPPRI) is isolated and
does not have any joint papers with any other entity
in the network.
South China Aero-motive Company, (SCNAC),
Zhouzhou, and Central Iron & Steel Research
Institute (CTISRI) located at Beijing have one joint
paper that links them.
China Aviation Power Plant Research Institute
(CAPPRI), Zhouzhou, and Hunan University of
Technology, Zhouzhou, have three joint papers
together but no papers with any other institution.
Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials, (BIAM)
with 11 papers is a major node. It has one paper
in which both Beihang University located at Beijing
as well as the Aviation Industry of China 1 (AVIC
1) at Shenyang are joint authors. This is the only
evidence of collaboration involving three (more
than two) organisations in the network. BIAM also
has one paper with Tsinghua University (TU),
Beijing. Tsinghua University in turn has a joint
paper with IH Heavy Industries Japan (IHHIJ).
BIAM is a part of the AVIC 1 group and appears to
be the major player in this sub-network.
The second major node in the network is the North
Western Polytechnical University X’ian (NWPUX)
with 7 papers. Of these seven papers 4 are
collaborations with other entities. Three of these
papers are joint collaborations with the Nanhua
Power Machine Research Institute (NPMRI),
Zhouzhou, the Nanhua Power Plant Research
Institute (NPRI), Zhouzhou and the Aviation
Institute Zhouzhou (AIZ) respectively. The fourth
collaborator is South West University of Science &
Technology, Mianyang (SWUSTM). NWPUX is a
major node with the others linked to it and not
directly to each other through a hub and spoke
configuration.
The third major node in this network is the Institute
of Metals Research Shenyang (IMRS) with five
papers. This seems to be a node that specifically looks
at working together with other research organisations
outside China. Two of its collaborations are with
Fukuoa Institute of Technology Japan (FITJ) and S.
Korea Advanced Institute of S&T (KAIST). The third
collaboration is with Shenyang Institute of Technology
Shenyang (SIT).
Seven of the collaborating institutions are located
in Zhouzhou. Four of them are located in Beijing
with three of them in Shenyang. There are 3 foreign
collaborating institutions and one institution each
in Xian and Mianyang.
The Chinese single crystal knowledge network has
the following structural features:
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Isolates or entities with no collaboration – 1
Number of two entity collaborations or
Dyads – 11
Number of three party collaborations or Triads – 1
Higher order collaborations - none
Each of the major nodes (BIAM, NWPUX and IMRS)
represents a different power centre with a largely
hub and spoke structure. They are not connected to
each other. Research Institutes dominate the
network followed by Universities. The role of
companies appears to be minimal with only two of
them directly represented in this network.
6.5 The US Single Crystal Knowledge Network
There were 115 papers published in the United
States between 1970 and 2009 that included the
terms “super alloys”, “turbines” and “single
crystal”. Of these 6 papers did not have any clear
institutional affiliation leaving 109 papers in our
data sample.
These 109 papers were produced by 45 different
entities. 43 of the 45 entities were US based while
two of them were based outside the United States
in Germany and Japan.
Of the 43 US based entities 18 were companies,
19 were educational institutions (either Institutes
of Technology or Universities), four are government
supported research laboratories and two of them
are government supported mission research
agencies.
Fifteen of the 45 organisations have no
collaboration with any of the other nodes in the
knowledge network. Eight companies out of 18 do
not collaborate. Five Universities out of 19 do not
collaborate.
There are three other network components that
are connected but separate from the largest
component sub-network. Georgia Institute of
Technology has a total of five papers one of which
is in collaboration with Washington State
University (WSU). WSU in turn has another paper
with a company Special Metals Corporation
(SMC). These three entities linked by WSU
constitute the first sub-component of the US
network.
The two other unconnected components involve
two organisations each. The Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL) has a total of 3 papers with
one joint paper with the German Aerospace Agency
(DLR).
The third dual collaboration is between the
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) and
a company Universal Analytics Incorporated (UAI)
with one joint paper.
The remaining 23 nodes are all connected with each
other through some form of collaboration. Figure
16 provides the details of this 23 node component
of the US network.
The major nodes in the above component network
are Pratt & Whitney (PAW) with 20 papers, General
Electric (GE) and Canon Muskegon Corporation
(CMC) with 16 papers each, and NASA with fifteen
papers. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)
and the Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB)
with 5 and four papers are also key links in the
network. Another company Rolls Royce with four
papers is also a player.
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Of the 23 nodes in this largest component of the
network, 8 are companies, 11 are Universities,
three are public research entities engaged in both
mission specific as well as general research in
aviation/aeronautics. The Wright Patterson Air
Force Base is also a key node.
AFRL and WPAFB are strongly connected. They are
also linked to the University of Dayton Research
Institute (UDRI). Through UDRI they are linked
to Pratt & Whitney (PAW) through a 3 party paper.
andto Universal Technology Corporation (UTC)
through another three party papers. They are also
linked to the University of California Davis (UCD)
and North Western University (NWU) and the
University of Illinois (UOI) through four and five
party joint papers. AFRL, WPAFB and UDRI are all
Dayton based. Amongst the various nodes in this
component network these seem to be the most
well-connected and coordinated network driven by
the Dayton-based Air Force organisations. UDRI is
the key node that links this closed ring to the rest
of the nodes. If UDRI is removed this connected
sub-network splits into two major unconnected
components.
Pratt & Whitney (PAW) has a fairly strong link with
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) with two
joint papers.
Canon Muskegon Corporation (CMC) and Rolls
Royce (RR) are strongly connected and together
linked to another engine company Allison
Engineering Company (AEC). CMC is also linked
through one joint paper with Solar Turbine Inc.
(STURBI). Honeywell International (HI) links CMC
Figure 16: The Largest Component in the US Knowledge Network -
Single Crystal Aircraft Turbine Blade Technology
The US Largest Connected Sub-network
23 component sub-network component –8 companies–11
universities–3 public research agencies–one direct user
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with a major node General Electric. If Honeywell
International is removed the network breaks down
to two separated components.
NASA, a major node, links two big companies GE
and PAW through one three-party paper. If this three
party link is taken out the larger network breaks
down into two separate unconnected networks.
Apart from the three-party paper that NASA has
with PAW and GE it also has one additional paper
with GE. So comparatively NASA and GE are fairly
well connected. NASA is also weakly linked to
University of Florida which has a total of four
papers.
Apart from the one paper with Honeywell
International(HI), GE has a four party paper with
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), Illinois
Institute of Technology (IIT) and Sandia National
Laboratory (SNL). GE also has one paper with
University of Michigan (UOM) which has a total of
3 papers.
Ohio State University with four papers is also a
fairly big producer of papers. It is very weakly linked
to the GE node through IIT. It also has one paper
with Princeton University (PCU).
An overall assessment of this largest component
of the US network reveals the following features:
• There is one very closely coordinated and
centrally directed closed ring under AFRL and
WPAFB. Through UDRI they are linked to the
larger network especially to companies.
• Canon Muskegon Corporation (CMC) and Rolls
Royce (RR) are strongly linked. They are also
linked to Allison Engine Corporation (AEC).
• GE is linked with NASA which also provides
a weak link between GE and PAW. Honeywell
International provides a weak link between
GE and CMC.
• PAW is also fairly well connected to Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute (RPI).
• In terms of linkages with Universities and
Research Institutes there does not appear to
be any major difference between GE and PAW.
• UDRI, Honeywell International (HI) and
NASA are the key links that make this
network remain connected.
• The largest component of the US knowledge
network - with the exception of the AFRL /
WPAFB and the CMC / RR / AEC rings -appears
to be a fairly weakly connected network.
6.6 Comparative Evaluation of the Knowledge
Networks in China & the USA
There are two aspects along which we need to
compare these knowledge networks related to
“super alloy”, “turbine” and “single crystal”. Since
knowledge in this particular case relates to the
production of papers we need to understand who
produces these papers and how many of these
papers are produced by individual organisations
and how many are produced jointly with other
organisations.
The second aspect requiring attention are the
specific structural features of the network which
will provide some idea on the nature and kind of
linkages that different organisations have within
the network.
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Based on these comparative evaluations we can
then make some inferences about the two
knowledge networks. Tables 5 and 6 provide
details of the knowledge networks of China and
the USA based on these aspects.
Companies and Universities dominate the US
Knowledge Network. Publicly supported Research
Organisations and Foreign Collaborators are
relatively small components of the overall
knowledge network.In contrast Publicly-supported
Research Organisations dominate the China single
crystal scene with universities playing an important
but secondary role. The role of companies in the
Chinese knowledge network appears to very much
smaller than in the US network.
The data also makes clear that the Chinese network
has much more collaborative work (47% of all
papers) going on than the US network where only
22% are collaborative papers and 78% are single
institution papers.
Table 5: Knowledge Generation in China & the US
Parameter China % USA %
Network size - nodes 19 NA 45 NA
Number of papers 30 NA 109 NA
Number of single institute
papers 16 53% 85 78%
Number of collaborative
papers 14 47% 24 22%
Number of papers per node 1.58 NA 2.42 NA
Number of papers per year 2.14 NA 3.63 NA
Number of companies 2 11% 18 40%
Number of Universities 5 26% 19 42%
Number of Research
Organisations 9 47% 6 13%
Number of Foreign
Collaborators 3 16% 2 4%
Table 6 provides details on the structural features
of the two knowledge networks.Table 6 reiterates
the point and makes clear once again that the US
network is more individualistic and less
collaborative than the Chinese network. Companies
dominate the US network whereas publicly
supported Research Institutes dominate the
Chinese scene.
Table 6: Knowledge Diffusion in China & the US
Parameter China % USA %
Network size - nodes 19 NA 45 NA
Number of major nodes 3 15.8% 7 15.7%
Number of unconnected
components of the network 6 NA 18 NA
Size of the largest network
component (number of 5 NA 23 NA
nodes)  nodes nodes
Number of isolates 1 5.3% 15 33.3%
Number of two-party links 11 6.4% 16 1.6%
Number of three party links 1 0.1% 5 0.04%
Number of four party links 0 0% 2 ~ 0%
Number of five party links 0 0% 1 ~ 0%
Two party or more
connections Total 12 6.5% 39 1.7%
Density of the network 0.094 9.4% 0.051 5.1%
Number of patents Small 1775
The largest component of the US network is a 23
node sub-network whereas the corresponding
components in China are two 5 node networks.
Since the power of the network increases as the
square of the number of nodes, the US network is
several orders of magnitude more powerful than
the Chinese network in terms of the diffusion of
information and ideas.
To get a better understanding about the differences
between the US and China in this domain of
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knowledge we also tried to understand how the
US ecosystem evolved historically. We choose to
divide the US knowledge network into two parts –
a period up to 1990 that coincides with the
approximate period of the expiry of the first single
crystal patent–and the period after 1990. The
comparison of the structural features of the US
network up to 1990 with the current Chinese
network may be more appropriate given
the different historical settings of these two
countries.
The US published 32 papers during the period 1970
to 1990. The major nodes were NASA with 12
papers, PAW with 8 papers CMC with 3 papers
including one collaborative paper with Honeywell
International and a number of other players
contributing individually. A special feature of the
network up to this time is that it does not exhibit
even the very loose connectedness that is revealed
in 2010. Each of the major nodes and all the smaller
nodes are working independently with the only
exception being provided by the joint paper
between Honeywell and CMC.
Tracing this evolution further, GE becomes a node
only in 1992 when it publishes its first paper. The
joint paper produced by AFRL, UDRI and PAW (see
Figure 16) was published in 1999 and the PAW /
NASA / GE joint paper is put out in 2004.
This makes it clear that the US network has emerged
from a very strongly individualistic and competitive
orientation to its current status of a loosely
connected set of very dominant players. This
evolution of the US network is consistent with the
maturing of the industry and the slowing down of
the growth in the market for the current offerings
of the aircraft industry. These collaborative
initiatives in knowledge reflect the larger
consolidation and cooperation that is taking place
between the major players in the US market.
This also reiterates in a sense the major differences
between the US and China in the organization of
their respective ecosystems of knowledge and
innovation. In contrast to the US network which
is individualistic, competitive and driven by
companies the Chinese network is collaborative,
top down and driven by publicly supported
research institutes.
Figures 17 and 15 and Tables 4 and 5 substantiate
the company driven market oriented individualistic
approach of the United States eco-system of
knowledge generation and diffusion in contrast to
the State sponsored Research Institute driven eco-
system of knowledge generation and diffusion in
China.
Having understood the process of knowledge
generation and diffusion in China and the US as
revealed through the published papers route it is
time for to integrate the different insights into a
cohesive picture of how knowledge gets generated
and transmitted within the knowledge ecosystems
of China and the US. This may help us better
understand Chinese capabilities in Science &
Technology and how these capabilities get
translated into value-added products and services.
7. Ecosystems of Innovation –
Comparing China & the US
7.1 Technology & Products – Overview of
Happenings in China & US
It is clear from the analysis carried out so far that
China had identified the development of a high
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thrust indigenous turbofan engine as a key element
in their strategy by 1980. Development work on
the related super alloy materials including the single
crystal route for the making of the turbine blades
had also begun around the same time.However the
WS-10 indigenous engine that they have developed
and qualified by about 2005 did not incorporate
the single crystal technology in the turbine blades
of this engine. The blades were made with the
earlier generation DS columnar grain technology.
The recently developed J-10 aircraft and the J-20
Stealth Fighter use Russian supplied power plants
and not an indigenously developed engine.
These developments seem to suggest that in spite
of a lot of effort China’s ability to build a state-of
art-engine incorporating key component
technologies such as single crystal super alloy
turbine blades has not matured to the level where
it can be incorporated into a product that can be
produced and used in large numbers.
Independent assessments going back to the mid-
nineties by US experts as well as claims made by
Chinese researchers in the technical literature seem
to suggest that researchers have been able to
satisfactorily resolve the knowledge problems
associated with single crystal technology. If this
were indeed so, it is surprising that this technology
has not been incorporated into the WS-10 engine
even after more than twenty years of development
effort.
In contrast the same single crystal aircraft turbine
blade technology and other similar technologies
went from invention to innovation in the United
States within a period of six to seven years. Other
countries in the west as well as Japan and the
former Soviet Union were also able to catch up
and match the pioneer within the space of a few
years.
Though the historical contexts between China and
the US within which these developments have taken
place are different, a clearer understanding of the
way in which technologies used in hi-tech dual use
products are identified and pursued to fruition may
be of interest.
7.2 Framework for Comparison of Country
Capabilities
There are a number of frameworks in the business
strategy literature that offer some insights into
these aspects. One such framework uses a product
or industry life cycle model that is interactively
coupled to a technology life cycle model and an
organisation choice model. Since technological
change is exponentially increasing, the ability of
organisations and networks of inter-connected
organizations to deal with change are often
constrained by organizational, political and
economic factors.
The historical setting within which countries and
organisations within these countries make decisions
also affect in some form the ability of a country and
its military industrial complex to respond to
emerging challenges. To deal with these kinds of
problems, models that are based on “interactively
coupled”, “ open system” “dynamic” approaches
may provide superior insights into the phenomena
we want to study – the ability of follower countries
to catch-up and match the more advanced countries
in strategic dual use technologies.
Figure 17 provides an overview of the choices that
China faced in trying to catch-up on single crystal
super alloy turbine blades technology.
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potential of the new technology and who are
able to bring in the required resources to take
it forward.
• Finally there must be decision-makers at the
higher level who are able to and sometimes
forced to take the risks associated with the
new and more uncertain trajectory of the
emerging technology.
If there are major constraints that a country or
organisation faces – such as export restrictions or
bans - then all three components may work in
tandem. Such constraints could often force
engineers to go back to basics and come up with
different approaches to the solution of
One way for a country or even a company to catch-
up with the leader is for it to move faster and skip
an entire generation of technology. In the case of
the aircraft turbine blade technology for China this
would mean skipping the Directionally Solidified
(DS) columnar technology and directly moving to
the next generation single crystal technology. For
such a choice to be exercised the following
conditions may be necessary:
• There must be experts within the ecosystem
who have been tracking and working on the
more advanced technology.
• There must be reasonably powerful champions
within the ecosystem who understand the
Figure 17: Trajectories of Development
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technological bottlenecks that they face. Both
middle level and top level decision-makers are also
more amenable to new ideas and approaches.
The challenge to the Chinese ecosystem based on
our review of aircraft, aircraft engine and single
crystal aircraft turbine blades can be conceptually
presented in the Figure 18 below.
7.3 A Comparative Evaluation of the US and
China Ecosystems
We can see that the development of the WS-10
engine that took place between 1980 and 1990
provided a window of opportunity to the Chinese
aircraft development ecosystem to bypass the
earlier generation DS technology and go directly
for the single crystal technology. Papers available
in the technical literature as well as independent
evaluation by outside entities suggest that the
Chinese had achieved substantial capabilities in
this domain between 1984 and 1995. In spite of
this supply side technological capability the Chinese
decision-making system was not able to take the
additional risk of going with a newer technology.
Even if it was difficult for Chinese top-level decision
makers to exercise such a choice early in the
development of the WS-10 engine, the decision to
go with the earlier generation DS columnar grain
technology could have been reversed as
development and capabilities in the pursuit of single
crystal technology gained momentum and the risks
became lower. Even this did not happen over the
approximately 25 year development and
qualification cycle of the WS-10 engine.
The US and the other advanced countries do not
appear to have such a problem. This is because
their ecosystems are not playing catch-up.
Technological bottlenecks and solutions to such
Superalloy – performance in turbine engines – the evolutionary story
Invention to use 6 to 7 years
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Figure 18: Window of Opportunity for China
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bottlenecks are relatively clearer for such advanced
technology powers and the trajectory of evolution
of technologies and their incorporation into
products and services is a logical result of an
evolutionary process in their respective
ecosystems. Knowledge developed somewhere
within their ecosystem, if found useful, is
assimilated by other entities who bring in new
variations of the knowledge into the ecosystem.
Competition in every level of the aircraft engine
development and production value chain is a
critical element in the ecosystems ability not only
to create a lot of technological opportunities but
also to pick from this basket of choices those
technologies that have the maximum potential to
push the envelope of performance of the product.
The US system is of course the biggest and the
most powerful of these ecosystems. But the
ecosystems of other countries in Europe, Japan and
even Russia seem to be able to play catch up fairly
quickly.
Our analysis clearly reveals that though the
technological supply side of the Chinese aircraft
engine development ecosystem had the capabilities
to make a single crystal super alloy turbine blade,
the larger political and economic side of this system
was unable to take the decision to incorporate this
capability into the WS-10 engine.
This seems to suggest that there are fundamental
differences between the Chinese and the US
ecosystems for the development and use of complex
high technology dual-use products. We will try to
draw upon the different strands of our analyses to
make comparisons between the Chinese and US
ecosystems. We will use the results of our analyses
to also address the question of China’s ability to
respond to and manage technology-driven
innovation.
The US ecosystem as revealed through both patents
and published papers is a much larger ecosystem
than the Chinese ecosystem. Our knowledge
networks analyses based on published papers
suggests that the US is a 45 node ecosystem
whereas China is only a 19 node ecosystem. There
is obviously a major difference in scale between
these two systems. Our patent data on the US
system reinforce these inferences.
The Chinese knowledge network has fewer major
nodes and these nodes are not connected to each
other. In contrast the US network has more major
nodes and many of these nodes are loosely
connected to the other nodes. This would suggest
that the Chinese knowledge networks are more
tightly coordinated and managed than knowledge
networks in the US. The Chinese system appears
to be a more top down planning driven system
than the more bottom-up competition driven US
system.
The largest connected component of the Chinese
knowledge network has only 5 nodes. The largest
connected component of the US network has 23
nodes. This reinforces the large difference in scale
between the two ecosystems. It also suggests that
knowledge generated anywhere within the US
network is able to diffuse relatively quickly to the
other nodes in the network. Knowledge generation
and diffusion within the Chinese network would
not be as quick or rapid as in the US system.
The Chinese network is much more collaborative
than the US network which is much more
individualistic. The percentage of collaborative
papers in the Chinese network at 47% is much
higher than the 22% in the US network. The
percentage of dyads and triads (two and three party
collaborations) in the Chinese network of 6.5% is
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far greater than the percentage of dyads and triads
in the US network which is 1.7%. The density of
the Chinese network is 0.09 which is much higher
than density of the US network which is 0.05.
These substantiate the greater individualistic
nature of the US knowledge network as compared
to the more collaborative Chinese network.
Even the current loosely coordinated US network
that is there has evolved from a significantly more
individualistic and competitive past. Since China
is currently where the US was about 20 years ago,
this reveals the stark contrasts between the two
systems. Taken together these differences indicate
that the Chinese network is made up of clusters of
coordinated top down activities with the clusters
themselves not being connected. The US network
on the other hand is much more loosely
coordinated or individualistic with many of them
very weakly connected to other nodes in the
system.
The composition of the generators and users of
knowledge are also different in the two systems.
Companies are the major nodes in the US network.
Though Universities also figure as major players
in the US they are not significant nodes in the
system. They are linked loosely to companies or
to publicly funded research institutions or function
as independent entities.
The early patents make clear that breakthroughs
in both DS as well as single crystal technologies
occurred at the research laboratories of companies
and not in universities or publicly funded research
institutions. The US culture also values patents
much more than publications at least in this
domain of knowledge with the number of patents
exceeding the number of publications. Patents also
precede publications in the US indicating that
Intellectual Property Rights have high value in the
ecosystem. China on the other hand does not seem
to set much value on patents. The emphasis is
more on papers rather than on patents.
The major players in the Chinese system are
government supported research institutes like the
Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials (BIAM)
or the Institute of Metals Research (IMRS). Though
there are two companies one of which is the
Aviation Industries of China 1 (AVIC1) they do
not seem to figure prominently in the knowledge
network.
Though Companies dominate the innovation
landscape in the US, our study reveals that many
of the pioneering companies had received critical
risk reducing R&D support from a number of
government-supported mission & R&D
organizations. Our review of the Patent record
reveals this fact clearly. The role of the various arms
of the defence forces seem to be particularly
important in supporting early R&D that offer
promise for the removal of technological
bottlenecks. The US appears to be particularly well-
endowed in this aspect since there appear to be
several independent entities in the ecosystem that
support such risk reducing initiatives. Though
China may also have several such schemes to
support early risk reducing R&D they may be more
centrally coordinated and may not be really
independent of each other. Clearly the US scale of
operation stemming from its status as a global
player that wants to preserve its dominant role in
world affairs enables it to be particularly munificent
in supporting several such independent initiatives.
What our study revealed through our analysis of
the early patents is reinforced in our knowledge
network analysis of the US system. In this
knowledge network we can see that the role of the
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various Air Force related research and operational
units and NASA in providing critical links even
between competing companies like GE and PAW.
The US therefore appears to have a competitive
market for the support of new ideas. The Chinese
have tried to emulate this US practice with several
different approaches for the promotion of new
technologies such as the 863 Plan. Such efforts
might help improve the supply side but without a
commensurate change in the demand side such
initiatives by themselves may not contribute in a
major way to the realization of value.
Apart from multiple sources for critical R&D
support during the early phase of technological
development, the US also has many independent
buyers for high technology performance enhancing
products. So for a company trying to promote a
novel performance enhancing technology there
could be several potential buyers for the new
product. The single crystal development period in
the US coincided with a major unprecedented
expansion of the national security system. The US
had a number of independent buyers many of
whom were willing to pay a premium for
performance enhancing products. Companies that
came up with path-breaking responses to
challenges faced by the national security
establishment could therefore have several
potential buyers for their products. This
significantly reduces market risk for companies
promoting such technologies.
The other characteristic of the US system is that
once the technology has been demonstrated in a
military system that often involves some form of
subsidy, it moves from the security domain into
the domain of civilian applications without any
major problems. Companies like Boeing, Lockheed,
Grumman, TRW and many others that compete
with each other have been able to do this for
aircraft. GE, PAW, Rolls Royce and several others
have done this successfully for aero-engines.
Though some consolidation is happening on the
demand side of the US ecosystem currently, it is
still a fairly competitive market with several big
buyers and several big sellers. Global dominance,
large scale and multiple large users are of course
the key drivers of this ecosystem and even today
with all the talk about the decline of US Power,
this has not changed significantly.
In the case of China there may not be that many
buyers for performance enhancing products. For
companies and countries playing catch-up, time
bound delivery of products and services that are
adequate is more important than being
contemporary in all dimensions of performance. In
case imports of products or licensed production or
even technology transfer agreements have been
worked out, the incentive for pushing new
approaches is significantly reduced and maybe
perceived as risky by the larger and more powerful
user community which in the case of the single
crystal technology could have been the PLAAF. Thus
part of the problem in catching up arises from the
creation of new entities within the ecosystem that
are responsible for the production and reverse
engineering of imported technologies. The dilemma
of choice between make and buy options become
exacerbated and more difficult to resolve in such
situations. Wherever such choices are foreclosed and
there is no choice but to do things on your own,
the abilities to catch up and move up the value chain
become significantly superior. China’s progress in
the domains of nuclear weapons, missiles and space
technologies where imports were not possible seems
to validate reaching such a conclusion.
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Figure 19: The US Eco-System for Knowledge Generation &
Use-Single Crystal Technology for Aircraft Turbine Blade
Figure 20: China's Ecosystem for Knowledge Generation &
Use - Single Crystal Technology for Aircraft Turbine Blade
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China has identified and tried to correct some of
these deficiencies. It has tried to create several
parallel sources for early funding support through
several independent expert review processes along
the lines of funding support extended by many
publicly supported US advanced research
organisations. This approach does help in
facilitating one critical activity in the chain from
idea generation to product development. However
managing the demand side does raise a number of
structural issues.
To facilitate competition at the company level
China broke up its large Aircraft development and
production complex called the Aviation Company
of China (AVIC) into two separate companies called
AVIC 1 and AVIC 2. However if one studies this re-
organisation carefully the division of work between
these two companies ensures that these two
entities do not directly compete with each other.
This suggests that political factors are still important
in many of the periodic re-organisations that take
place in many parts of the military industrial
complex of China. More recently the Chinese have
again merged AVIC 1 and AVIC 2 back into one
entity. This raises the question whether planned
top down interventions can substitute for
competition driven evolutionary approaches to the
technology creation, selection and diffusion
problem.
There is also the question of scale. Currently China
may lack the scale to support several independent
players in each part of a dual use technology value
chain. However as China becomes richer and its
strategic interests expand to cover the globe this
issue may become less important. Viewed from this
perspective China may still need more time to be
able to catch up with the more advanced countries
of the world.
While this problem is evident in areas where China
is trying to catch up this is not always true in all
domains. China’s creative solution to the threat
that it faces from US aircraft carriers in the western
Pacific Ocean clearly reflects a back to basics
approach of the Chinese ecosystem that deals with
the domains of space and missiles. This does
indicate that if conditions are suitable the Chinese
can respond creatively with novel and innovative
approaches. However in the more traditional
domains where such constraints are not present
such as the aircraft industry, playing catch up and
then reversing the disadvantage to an advantage
appears to be more problematic.
Figure 19 presents an overview of the US value
chain as revealed through our study of single crystal
technology. Figure 20 presents a similar overview
of the Chinese system.
The critical links in the Chinese ecosystem are
research institutes that are connected but
organizationally separated from aircraft companies.
There is therefore one additional element in the
value chain that is not there in the US where the
R&D element in a company directly comes under
the ambit of a company’s control and direction.
Clearly the demand side of this value chain in the
case of China is very different from that of the
United States. These differences may represent
fundamental differences between the two systems
in the management of hi-tech dual use technologies
and products. While some of the differences
between these two systems can be bridged by some
alteration of the structures as China becomes richer,
the ideological differences in terms of the role of
the State and the power equations that determine
the direction of change appear to be different
between these two systems.
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List of institutions in China involved in Single Crystal turbine blade research and
development
Institute of Metal research, Shenyang IMRS
Fukuoka InstituteOf Technology, Japan FITJ
BeihangUniv BHU
Beijing Institute of Aeronautical  Materials BIAM
Tsinghua University TU
I H Heavy industries, japan IHHIJ
Hunan University of Technology HNUT
China Aviation Power Plant Research Institute CAPPRI
Southwest University of Science &Technology, Mianyang SWUSTM
Northwestern Polytechnic University, Xi'an NWPUX
Nanhua Power Machine Research Institute NPMRI
KAIST, South korea KAIST
Shenyang Institute of Technology SIT
Aviation Institute,Zhuzhou AIZ
Zhuzhou AviationPowerplant Research Institute ZAPRI
South China National Aeromotive Co SCNAC
Central Iron and Steel Research Institute CTISRI
NanhuaPowerplant Research Institute NPRI
Failure Analysis Center of AVIC AVIC
Annexure 1
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List of institutions in USA involved in Single Crystal turbine blade research and
development
National Aeronautical Space Association NASA
Air Force Research Laboratories AFRL
University of Florida UOF
 Illinois Institute of Technology IIT
University of Michigan UOM
General Electric Company GE
Sandia National Laboratories SNL
Ohio State University OSU
Princeton University PSU
Carnegie Mellon University CMU
Honeywell International HI
Cannon-Muskegon Corporation CMC
Solar Turbines Inc STURBI
Rolls-Royce RR
Allison Engine Company AEC
Pratt and Whitney PAW
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute RPI
University of Dayton Research Institute UDRI
Universal Technology Corporation UTC
Wright-Patterson AFB WPAFB
Northwestern University NWU
University of California, Davis UCD
University of Illinois UOI
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